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Abstract 
Right- (vs. left-) wing adherents often hold more anti-Muslim attitudes, 
disapprove of Syrian refugees in their country, are more concerned about terrorism, and 
endorse military action to combat ISIS (Islamist terrorist group). Past research suggests 
that media shapes attitudes generally; however, the role of news media in explaining left-
right differences in attitudes regarding Islamist terrorism has not been explored.  
Study 1a asked experts (N = 22) to assess the political leaning of news sources 
used in Canada. Study 1b (N = 201) subsequently assessed whether use and trust of 
liberal and conservative sources (as determined in Study 1a) explained left-right 
differences in anti-Muslim attitudes, anti-refugee attitudes, and terrorism imminence 
beliefs. Results showed that greater right-wing adherence was associated with greater 
trust of conservative news and less use and trust of liberal news. There were indirect 
paths between right-wing adherence and attitudes through liberal and conservative news 
use and trust (combined), with specific indirect paths between right-wing adherence and 
attitudes through liberal news use. 
To assess the causal effect of terrorism-related news on attitudes regarding 
terrorism, Muslims, Syrian refugees, and military support, Study 2 randomly assigned 
participants (N = 305) to watch news clips on terrorism from liberal or conservative 
sources, or to watch sports news (control). I assessed whether there was an indirect path 
between media exposure and attitudes through fear or anger regarding ISIS, and whether 
right-wing adherence moderates the relation between news exposure and negative affect. 
Results revealed that conservative-terrorism news elicited more negative attitudes relative 
to both liberal-terrorism and control conditions, and that liberal-terrorism news did not 
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elicit more negative attitudes relative to the control. These relations were not explained 
by differences in affect elicited, nor did right-wing adherence moderate the relation 
between news exposure and affect. However, exploratory analyses revealed that 
conservative news had a particularly strong effect on attitudes when participants trusted 
these sources.  
Overall these results suggest that conservative (relative to liberal) news increases 
negative group attitudes, particularly when participants trust these sources. As such, 
undermining trust in conservative news and encouraging use of liberal news outlets may 
be important avenues for prejudice reduction. 
Keywords: anti-Muslim attitudes, anti-refugee attitudes, terrorism, right-wing 
adherence, news media 
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Shaping Responses to Terrorism, Muslims, and Syrian Refugees: The Role of Right-wing 
Adherence and News Media Exposure 
In 2011, Syrian citizens began fleeing their homes from civil war and seeking 
refuge in neighbouring countries (Syrian Refugees, 2014). Five years later, the number of 
Syrian refugees had reached between 5 and 9 million, and violence in Syria has escalated 
to include terror attacks from the Islamist extremist group ISIS (Syrian Refugees, 2014; 
The Guardian, 2017). This massive migration has been declared an international crisis, 
with organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union urging Western 
countries to provide financial aid and asylum for these refugees. However, among 
Westerners, calls for re-settlement have been met with concerns regarding immigration 
and opposition to hosting Syrian refugees in their country (Syrian Refugees, 2014). For 
instance, among Canadians, 29% believe the government should severely limit the 
number of accepted refugees, and another 42% believe that the government should stop 
accepting Syrian refugees altogether (The Globe and Mail, 2016).  In the US, President 
Donald Trump has similarly called for a complete halt to the Syrian refugee programme 
(Shabad, 2017).  
Meanwhile, Islamophobia and anti-Muslim prejudice are also on the rise. Since the 
early 2000s, there has been a steady increase in anti-Muslim attitudes in Canada, in the 
USA, and in multiple European countries (Gallup, n. d.; Geddes, 2013; Pew Research 
Center, 2008). Also on the rise are public concerns regarding terrorism. Opponents of 
refugee re-settlement initiatives often express concern about the large portion of Syrian 
refugees who practice Islam, stressing the possibility that Islamist terrorists may gain 
entrance into Western countries via refugee re-settlement (e.g., FOX News, 2016). 
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Similarly, increases in anti-Muslim attitudes coincide with the occurrence of major 
Islamist terrorist attacks, suggesting that Islamophobia is, in part, driven by fear of 
terrorism (Gallup, n.d). The purpose of the current study is to explore predictors of anti-
refugee prejudice, anti-Muslim prejudice, and beliefs about the imminence of a terrorist 
attack to better understand the psychological bases for such reactions.  
Ideological Differences in Attitudes Regarding Muslims, Refugees, and 
Terrorism 
Past research suggests that right-wing ideologies, such as conservatism, may be 
related to negative attitudes regarding Muslims and Syrian refugees, and stronger beliefs 
about terrorism being imminent and in need of military intervention. In contemporary US 
psychological research, conservatism is typically operationalized as preference for 
inequality and tradition/convention (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Skitka, 
Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002). As such, self-rated conservatives (vs. 
liberals) tend to prefer a hierarchically organized society and express opposition to 
societal changes that weaken the role of traditional values (Jost et al., 2003). Further, 
conservativism is associated with a greater tendency to emphasize the role of an 
individual’s stable, internal dispositions as a prime cause of his or her behaviour. In 
contrast, liberals (vs. conservatives) prefer equality, accept change, and more often 
emphasize how situational factors play a central role in influencing a person’s behaviour 
(Jost et al., 2003; Skitka et al., 2002).  
Nonetheless, use of the terms conservativism and liberalism can meaningfully 
differ between cultures. For instance, conservative political candidates in the United 
States are often more right-leaning relative to conservative political parties in Canada 
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(Political Compass, 2016a, 2016b). This means that conservatives in Canada may have 
ideologies most similar to Americans who fall in the middle of their political spectrum. 
Likewise, liberal political parties in Canada often fall much to the left-end of the political 
spectrum relative to liberal political candidates in America (Political Compass, 2016a, 
2016b). As such, individuals who identify as liberal in Canada may have more left-wing 
ideologies relative to those who identify as liberal in America. 
Moreover, the terms “liberal” and “conservative” are sometimes used in ways that 
depart from their common usage in American politics. For instance, “neoliberalism” 
reflects the belief that government spending should be reduced by increasing privatization 
of public organizations, a belief that largely reflects a conservative ideology regarding the 
economy (Muralidhar, 2016). Further, some countries (e.g., Canada, Australia, United 
Kingdom) have political parties called Liberal or Conservative that may or may not 
wholly endorse liberal or conservative ideals, respectively. As such, individuals’ political 
ideology (liberal or conservative) may not completely align with their political party 
affiliation (Liberal or Conservative).  
Nonetheless, political party identification and voting behaviour is strongly 
associated with self-rated political ideology (Jost, 2006). For instance, in the United 
States, correlations between political party identification (Republican or Democrat) and 
self-reported political ideology are high, often in the .80 range (Jost, 2006; see also 
Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016). Moreover, the central tenets of liberalism and conservatism 
(e.g., favouring equality, preferring tradition, etc.) are largely consistent across cultures, 
and self-rated political ideology predicts similar outcomes in various countries (e.g., 
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threat perceptions; Jost, 2006), even if countries vary in the degree of ideological contrast 
or polarization (Duckitt, 2001; Roccato & Ricolfi, 2005). 
 Views on immigration and national security differ markedly between liberals and 
conservatives, and recent international events including the Syrian refugee crisis and 
terrorist attacks from ISIS may further polarize left- and right-wing views (e.g., Pew 
Research Center, 2014a). For instance, 93% of American Republicans (who are 
predominantly conservative; Jost, 2006) consider ISIS a major threat to their country, 
72% believe that military force is the best way to defeat ISIS, and 67% disapprove of the 
acceptance of Syrian refugees into the USA (Pew Research Center, 2015). In contrast, 
79% of American Democrats (who are predominantly liberal; Jost, 2006) believe that 
ISIS is a major threat to the USA, but 66% believe that reliance on military force fosters 
rather than defeats terrorism, and 69% approve of the acceptance of Syrian refugees (Pew 
Research Center, 2015). Canadian polls have reported similar results: 89% of Liberal 
Party supporters and 77% of NDP Party supporters (who are predominantly liberal or 
left-leaning) approved of government plans to remove military forces from the Middle 
East, whereas only 38% of Conservative Party supporters (who are predominantly 
conservative or right-leaning) agreed that this approach is appropriate (Anderson & 
Coletto, 2015). 
In-line with poll findings, greater conservatism (vs. liberalism) tends to be 
associated with greater prejudice towards a variety of groups including immigrants 
(Davidov & Meuleman, 2012) and Muslims (Ogan, Willnat, Pennington, & Bashir, 
2014). For instance, even while controlling for demographic factors such as age, income, 
and church attendance, past research found that greater conservatism was associated with 
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more anti-Muslim attitudes and endorsement of fewer rights for Muslims (Ogan et al., 
2014; for similar findings on anti-Black prejudice see Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). 
Moreover, these findings extend across cultures, with associations between conservatism 
and anti-Muslim attitudes found in American, German, and French samples (Ogan et al., 
2014). 
Like conservatism, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is also classified as a right-
wing ideology. RWA is operationalized as being conventional, traditional, and aggressive 
towards norm violators (Altemeyer, 1996). Although related to political conservatism, 
many argue that RWA and conservatism represent distinct constructs (e.g., Crowson, 
Thoma, & Hestevold, 2005; see also Choma, Ashton, & Hafer, 2010).  Like 
conservatism, across cultures, those higher (vs. lower) in RWA are more likely to hold 
anti-immigrant attitudes (Altemeyer, 1996; Hodson & Costello, 2007; Hodson, Hogg, & 
MacInnis, 2009), particularly where immigrants are perceived as responsible for 
increasing crime rates (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010). Likewise, those higher (vs. lower) in RWA 
generally endorse anti-immigration policies (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2013). Past research 
also found that Swiss participants who value security, conformity, and tradition also hold 
more negative attitudes towards Muslim veils (Fasel, Green, & Sarrasin, 2013) and, with 
regard to terrorism, Americans higher (vs. lower) in RWA more strongly believe that 
Islamist terrorists threaten Americans’ values and way of life (Crowson, 2009). 
Another type of right-wing ideology, social dominance orientation (SDO), has been 
operationalized as preference for social inequality and intergroup hierarchies (Ho et al., 
2015; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). SDO is 
moderately related to RWA (Hodson, MacInnis, & Busseri, 2017; Sibley & Duckitt, 
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2008) and conservatism, but is generally considered a distinct construct (e.g., Pratto et al., 
1994; Sidanius et al., 1996). Like both conservatism and RWA, SDO has been associated 
with negative outgroup (i.e., other group) attitudes and heightened threat perceptions 
regarding terrorism. For instance, Americans higher (vs. lower) in SDO more strongly 
believe that terrorism threatens their country’s power and puts the economy at risk 
(Crowson, 2009). Across multiple Western countries, SDO is also associated with more 
anti-immigrant attitudes and greater support for anti-immigration policies (Cohrs & 
Stelzl, 2010; Costello & Hodson, 2011; Craig & Richeson, 2013; Hodson & Costello, 
2007).  
Together, this past research suggests that greater right-wing ideologies 
(conservatism, RWA, SDO) may be associated with more anti-Muslim attitudes, more 
negative attitudes regarding Syrian refugees, and stronger concerns regarding terrorism. 
Indeed, these right-wing ideologies have conceptual similarities and some degree of 
statistical overlap. However, in the present thesis these constructs are considered 
separately given varying interests in the field, with some researchers particularly 
interested in one of the right-wing ideologies over others.  
Role of the Media in Shaping Attitudes Toward Terrorists and Refugees 
 Several researchers suggest that differences between left- and right-wing 
adherents in attitudes towards marginalized groups can, in part, be explained by 
differences in media preferences (e.g., de Zuniga, Correa, & Valenzuela, 2012; Sobieraj 
& Berry, 2011; Woods & Arthur, 2014). For instance, Valkenburg and Peter (2013) 
proposed the Differential Susceptibility of Media Effects model (DSMM) to explain 
relations between individual differences, media use, and behaviour and attitudes. This 
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model represents the integration of several well-supported theories, including Bandura’s 
(1986) Social Cognitive Theory and Klapper’s (1960) Selective Exposure Theory. The 
DSMM suggests that individuals choose media that align with their dispositions (e.g., 
personality, temperament), or are encouraged by social influences (e.g., friends, family, 
norms). Media use then elicits different emotional, cognitive, or physiological reactions, 
depending on the individual’s dispositions and environment. Emotional, cognitive, or 
physiological reactions then elicit distinct attitudes or behaviour. The DSMM has 
received support from recent investigations examining the influence of dispositional 
factors and media use on women’s body image in Western countries (Perloff, 2014), and 
interactions between family environment and media in promoting aggressive behaviour 
among Dutch participants (Fikkers, Piotrowski, Weeda, Vossen, & Valkenburg, 2013).  
In-line with the DSMM, political ideology is related to different media 
preferences (Valkenburg & Peter, 2013; see also Jost, 2017). For example, Americans 
with a more conservative (vs. liberal) ideology tend to prefer more conventional media 
with themes such as history or non-fiction, or media with thrilling or adventure themes 
such as war (Xu & Peterson, 2017). In contrast, American liberals (vs. conservatives) 
prefer dark or alternative media themes such as science fiction and metal music, as well 
as aesthetic/musical media like opera and poetry (Xu & Peterson, 2017). Liberals and 
conservatives also differ with regard to the types of science books they purchase, or 
whether they purchase science books (Shi, Shi, Dokshin, Evans, & Macy, 2017). 
Likewise, American participants gravitate toward and share political information with 
those who have similar ideologies on social networking sites, a relation particularly 
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strong among right- (vs. left-) wing adherents (Boutyline & Willer, in press; Barberá, 
Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015).  
 Importantly, political ideology is also associated with news media preferences. 
Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng (2009) found that Americans spend more time reading 
news articles that are consistent with their prior ideologies. For example, those who 
endorsed liberal policies spent more time reading articles such as “Firearm Threat” and 
“Universal Healthcare,” whereas those who endorsed conservative policies spent more 
time reading articles entitled “Cruelty of Pro-Choice” and “Self-defense Rights.” Thus, 
the left and right are drawn to different content. Left- and right-wing adherents also tend 
to prefer different news outlets. For instance, American conservatives prefer FOX News 
and avoid NPR, whereas American liberals avoid FOX News and prefer NPR (Iyengar & 
Hahn, 2009). Sources such as the Sean Hannity Show, Rush Limbaugh Show, the Glenn 
Beck Program, The Blaze, and Drudge Report also tend to have a more politically 
conservative audience (Pew Research Center, 2014b). In contrast, liberals tend to use 
sources such as CBS, MSNBC, BBC and the New York Times (Pew Research Center, 
2014b).  Liberals (vs. conservatives) also tend to watch more political news programs 
with comedic or satirical elements, such as Daily Show and Last Week Tonight with John 
Oliver (Franke, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2014b). Further, political ideology is 
associated with trust of different news sources, with American liberals more trusting of 
sources such as the BBC and the New York Times, and conservatives more trusting of 
FOX News and the Sean Hannity Show (Pew Research Center, 2014b). That is, 
conservatives and liberals use more and are more trusting of conservative and liberal 
news sources, respectively.  
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 The DSMM not only suggests that dispositions predict media choice, but also that 
media use, in turn, predicts behaviour and attitudes (Valkenburg & Peter, 2013). For 
instance, news exposure can foster negative attitudes towards marginalized groups. 
Among Italians, greater exposure to news on immigration was associated with more 
intergroup anxiety regarding immigrants (Visintin, Voci, Pagotta, & Hewstone, 2017). 
Moreover, Americans who more closely followed news on controversies surrounding 
Muslims were more likely to believe that Islam encourages violence and that Muslims 
should be denied rights (Ogan et al., 2014).  
 However, it may be the case that not all news information, even on topics such as 
terrorism, fosters negative attitudes towards marginalized groups equally. Rather, use of 
specific news sources may be particularly important in shaping attitudes. For instance, 
Americans who reported greater (vs. lesser) use of conservative news sources (e.g., FOX 
News, Rush Limbaugh) have reported less acknowledgement of and concern regarding 
climate change, and were more likely to deny that climate change disproportionally 
affects economically disadvantaged populations (Li, Hilgard, Scheufele, Winneg, & 
Jamieson, 2016). In contrast, greater (vs. lesser) use of liberal news sources (e.g., NPR, 
MSNBC) was associated with greater acknowledgment and concern regarding climate 
change, as well as greater belief that climate change could negatively impact poorer 
populations (Li et al., 2016). There are similar findings with regard to marginalized 
groups. For instance, among Americans, greater use of FOX News (vs. CNN) predicted 
more negative attitudes toward Mexican immigrants (de Zuniga et al., 2012). As such, the 
relation between right-wing adherence and attitudes towards Muslims, terrorism, and 
Syrian refugees may be attributable to specific news source preferences. Put another way, 
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the left-right divide on topics such as Muslim attitudes and reactions toward terrorism 
might be partially explained by differential use of news sources. However, this potential 
relation has not yet been empirically explored. 
 Our first aim was to determine the political leaning of news outlets in a Canadian 
context. Although particular news sources, such as FOX News, have been consistently 
linked with conservatism in the USA (e.g., Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Pew Research Center, 
2014b), polls show that there are notable differences in the political spectrum between 
Canada and the United States (The Political Compass, 2016a, 2016b). For instance, 
Canadian Liberal Party policy tends to be more left-leaning relative to American liberal 
policy (The Political Compass, 2016a, 2016b). Further, Canadians likely differ from 
Americans in their access to particular news media sources. Canadians, for instance, can 
access some (but not all) American news channels, but Americans can (or do) access very 
little Canadian news (at least on television). As such, it is possible that news source 
preferences among Canadian conservatives and liberals may differ relative to their 
American counterparts. Therefore, in Study 1a, we first asked expert raters in Canada to 
assess the political leaning of various news outlets. 
We then rely on news source ratings from Study 1a to create measures of average 
liberal and conservative news use and trust in Study 1b. Doing so allows us to assess 
whether these news preferences (use and trust) mediate (or explain) relations between 
right-wing ideology and attitudes towards Muslims, terrorism, and Syrian refugees in 
Study 1b.   
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Study 1a 
 
Prior to assessing whether use and trust of conservative or liberal news sources 
mediates the relation between right-wing adherence and attitudes towards terrorism, 
Muslims, and Syrian refugees, we first assessed the political leaning of various news 
outlets. Doing so allows us to create accurate indicators of liberal and conservative news 
use and trust (potential mediators in Study 1b). We first review past research on the 
political leaning of news sources in the United States. However, given differences in 
political ideology and access to different news outlets between Canada and the US (The 
Political Compass, 2016a, 2016b), it is possible that news source preferences among 
Canadians differ relative to Americans. Therefore, we also collected and analyzed expert 
ratings of news outlets in a Canadian context given that our subsequent focus involves 
reactions to news in Canada. 
Evidence from Polls and Studies 
Pew Research (2014b) examined the political ideology and news source habits of 
over 3000 Americans, finding that there are differences in news preferences between 
those who identify as politically liberal and conservative. For instance, NPR, Washington 
Post, Huffington Post, and New Yorker Magazine are used by 82-92% (and trusted by 
32-72%) of those who identify as consistently liberal in their ideology. In contrast, these 
sources are only used by 67-87% (and trusted by 1-7%) of those who identify as 
consistently conservative. Sources such as Buzzfeed and the Guardian are less used and 
trusted by Americans overall, but still receive a more positive response from liberals. 
These sources are used by 69% and 60% (and trusted by 21% and 6%) of consistent 
liberals. In contrast, Buzzfeed and the Guardian are only used by 37% and 25% (and 
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trusted by 2% and less than 1%) of consistent conservatives. Pew Research also found 
that liberals (vs. conservatives) more often use and trust news outlets with a comedic or 
satirical structure, such as the Daily Show, and the Colbert report. 
In contrast, consumers of sources such as FOX News, the Sean Hannity Show, 
and the Rush Limbaugh Show, are overwhelmingly conservative, with 43-84% consistent 
conservatives (vs. 1-10% of liberals) reporting use of these outlets, and 58-88% reporting 
trust in the source (vs. 0-6% of consistent liberals). Moreover, Pew Research suggests 
that coverage of Democratic candidates on FOX News is largely negative in tone 
(Holcomb, 2014). For instance, 46% of the total coverage of Barack Obama on FOX in 
2012 featured a negative tone, whereas only 6% featured a positive tone. However, very 
little research has explored the political leaning of audiences of uniquely Canadian 
sources (e.g., CBC, Global News), and some American news outlets may be relatively 
unavailable to, or disregarded by, Canadians. As such, it is important to empirically 
assess the leaning of news outlets in a Canadian context. 
To assess the political leaning of news media in Canada, we obtained ratings of 
the political leaning of news sources from a sample of Canadians with expertise in 
political ideology and news media. We used these ratings to determine which sources 
were characterized by a conservative or liberal leaning. We then used the 10 sources with 
the most conservative ratings to create measures of average conservative news use and 
trust in Study 1b. Likewise, we used the 10 sources with the most liberal ratings to create 
measures of average liberal news use and trust. These composite measures were then 
used to assess whether conservative and liberal news use and trust mediates relations 
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between right-wing adherence and attitudes towards Muslims, Syrian refugees, and 
terrorism (i.e., model tests) in Study 1b. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Data were collected from 23 psychologists, political scientists, or psychology 
graduate students known to the researchers to have knowledge of political ideology and 
news sources. All the contacted participants were working at a Canadian university, most 
of whom were Canadian citizens. One participant was excluded for being an outlier on 
ratings of five news sources (i.e., scoring greater than three standard deviations above the 
mean). The final sample comprised 19 faculty members and 3 students.  
Participants from various universities were recruited via email. All measures were 
administered online via Qualtrics. After indicating consent, participants anonymously 
rated the extent to which various news sources featured a conservative (vs. liberal) slant. 
Participants then indicated whether they were a faculty member or student (Appendix J) 
before being presented with debriefing information.  
Materials 
 Political leaning of news sources measure. To assess the political leaning of 
different news sources, we expanded a list of American news outlets from the Pew 
Research Center (2014b) to include numerous Canadian sources. In total, participants 
rated 33 news sources (e.g., FOX News, Global News, NPR; Appendix A) on a 7-point 
Likert scale (1= very liberal, 7 = very conservative) or indicated that they did not know 
where the source fell on the political spectrum (which was coded as missing data).  
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 Demographics. Participants indicated whether they were a student or faculty 
member (Appendix B). 
Results 
 Descriptive statistics for the highest rated (i.e., most conservative) and lowest 
rated (i.e., most liberal) news outlets can be seen in Table 1. We originally planned to use 
the 10 sources with the highest and lowest ratings for measures of conservative news use 
and trust, and liberal news use and trust, respectively. However, two of the most 
conservative-rated sources received tied scores. As such, we expanded this criterion to 
include the 11 highest and lowest rated sources. Results reveal that the Guardian, CBC, 
Buzzfeed, New Yorker Magazine, PBS, Huffington Post Canada, Huffington Post, Real 
Time with Bill Maher, NPR, the Daily Show, and Last Week Tonight were rated as 
relatively lower (i.e., more liberal) on average (range 1.70 to 3.11; Table 1). In contrast, 
FOX News, Sun News, National Post, Forbes, Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Globe 
and Mail, CNN, Global News, and Maclean’s were rated relatively higher (i.e., more 
conservative) on average (range 4.14 to 6.70; Table 1).  
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Table 1 
Ratings of the Political Leaning of Conservative and Liberal News Outlets (Study 1a) 
Conservative Sources M SD N 
Fox News 6.70 0.56 23 
Sun News 6.00 1.05 21 
National Post 5.70 0.82 23 
Forbes 5.40 0.91 15 
Wall Street Journal 5.33 0.73 21 
USA Today 4.71 1.31 17 
Globe and Mail 4.30 1.15 23 
CNN 4.26 1.25 23 
CBS News 4.18 1.33 17 
Global News 4.14 1.15 21 
Maclean's 4.14 1.53 21 
Liberal Sources    
Guardian 3.11 1.94 18 
Buzzfeed 3.10 1.60 10 
CBC 3.00 1.24 23 
New Yorker Magazine 2.90 1.29 20 
Huffington Post Canada 2.75 1.29 20 
PBS 2.70 0.93 23 
Huffington Post 2.62 1.36 21 
NPR 2.45 0.94 20 
Real Time with Bill Maher 2.40 1.18 15 
Daily Show 1.91 1.12 23 
Last Week Tonight 1.70 0.80 20 
Note. Higher scores reflect more perceived conservative leaning. Daily Show = Daily 
Show with John Stewart/Trevor Noah, Last Week Tonight = Last Week Tonight with 
John Oliver. 
 
Study 1a Discussion 
 Results from Study 1a largely confirm the political leaning of liberal and 
conservative sources identified by American research. According to Pew, NPR, the 
Guardian, Buzzfeed, New Yorker Magazine, PBS, Huffington Post, and the Daily Show 
(determined to be liberal in the current study) are more often used and trusted by 
 SHAPING RESPONSES 16  
Americans with a consistently liberal ideology. Pew did not examine Last Week Tonight 
with John Oliver or Real Time with Bill Maher, but other external sources show that 
these outlets have a mostly liberal audience (e.g., Franke, 2016).  
 The sources identified to be conservative in the current study are also largely 
consistent with external research. Pew Research found that FOX News is most often used 
and trusted by those with a consistent conservative ideology. Moreover, FOX News has 
been repeatedly accused of featuring a right-wing bias with the aim of furthering a 
conservative agenda (Media Matters, 2004). With regard to the Canadian sources 
identified to be conservative in Study 1a (i.e., Sun News, Globe and Mail, Global News, 
and Maclean’s), external sources also suggest these sources feature a right-wing bias 
(e.g., Gutstein, 2011). However, among Americans, CNN, USA Today, and CBS News, 
tend to fall in the middle of the US political spectrum (Pew Research, 2014b). In contrast, 
these sources appear to be perceived as more conservative in a Canadian context. This 
presumably reflects cultural differences in political ideology between Canada and the 
USA, in that right-leaning Canadians may be most similar to centrist Americans in some 
aspects of their ideology. As such, we use the results from the current study to inform our 
measures of conservative and liberal news use and trust in Study 1b in order to assess 
whether news media preferences explain the relation between right-wing adherence and 
attitudes towards terrorism, Muslims, and Syrian refugees among Canadian participants. 
Study 1b 
The purpose of Study 1b is to explore whether greater right-wing adherence 
predicts more anti-Muslim attitudes, more prejudice toward Syrian refugees, and greater 
belief in an imminent terrorist attack, and if so, to get an understanding of whether news 
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media use can explain some of the left-right difference. Specifically, using sources 
identified to be liberal or conservative in Study 1a, we explored whether news media 
preferences (use and trust of liberal or conservative sources) mediate any left-right divide 
in attitudes about Muslims and Syrian refugees, and beliefs about terrorist attack 
likelihood in a Canadian context (see conceptual relations in Figure 1).  In the current 
study, we posited four hypotheses (see Figure 1): 
H1: Right-wing adherence (conservatism, RWA, or SDO) will predict more anti- 
Muslim prejudice, more negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees, and greater 
belief in an imminent terrorist attack. 
H2: Higher right-wing adherence will be associated with greater use and trust of 
conservative news sources, whereas lower right-wing adherence will be 
associated with greater use and trust of liberal news sources.  
H3: Greater use and trust of conservative news sources will predict more anti-
Muslim prejudice, more anti-refugee prejudice, and greater belief in an imminent 
terrorist attack. Conversely, greater use and trust of liberal sources will predict 
less anti-Muslim prejudice, less prejudice toward Syrian refugees, and less belief 
in an imminent attack. 
H4: News source preferences (use and trust) will serve an indirect pathway 
between right-wing adherence and the specified criteria (e.g., negative attitudes 
and terrorism imminence beliefs). In this manner, differences in the consumption 
of conservative (vs. liberal) news sources will at least partially explain or account 
for left-right divide in perceptions of terrorism imminence and various prejudices 
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(for similar rationale, see Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Hodson & Busseri, 2012; 
Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  
 
Figure 1. Conceptual indirect effects model predicting belief in an imminent terrorist 
attack, anti-Muslim prejudice, and prejudice towards Syrian refugees. Con = 
conservative, lib = liberal. Measures of right-wing adherence include conservatism, right-
wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation. Paths from right-wing 
adherence to criteria represent paths with mediators included in the model (c-prime).  
Residuals were allowed to covary, but paths are not shown here for brevity. 
 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 Data were collected from 288 Canadians recruited online. Participants were 
excluded if they failed an attention check (i.e., indicating that they use a 
fabricated/fictitious news source), were missing more than 50% of their data, or if they 
were Muslim (one of our key target groups). Additionally, duplicate IP addresses were 
excluded to ensure that each participant only contributed one set of responses to the 
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dataset. In instances of duplicate IP addresses, the first set of responses associated with 
the address was kept and any subsequent ones were removed; this removed 9 sets of 
responses from the dataset. After exclusions, the final sample comprised 201 participants 
(59.2% female, 36.3% male, 4.5% other or unknown, Mage = 31.84, SD = 12.79), 84.6% 
of whom were White, 7.0% were Aboriginal, 6.0% were Asian, and 12.5% identified as 
another ethnicity. 
 Participants were recruited via Kijji ads placed in major Canadian cities, as well 
as on a Reddit forum devoted to recruiting participants for online surveys. All measures 
were administered online via Qualtrics. After indicating consent, participants completed 
measures of right-wing adherence (conservatism, RWA, SDO) presented in random 
order. Participants then rated the extent to which they used and trusted each of the various 
news sources (separately). Then participants completed measures of anti-Muslim 
attitudes, prejudice towards Syrian refugees, and belief in an imminent terrorist attack, 
which were presented in random order. Participants then provided demographic 
information before being debriefed. For compensation, participants had the opportunity to 
be entered in to a draw for 1 of 10 $20 gift cards from a national coffee chain outlet (Tim 
Hortons). 
Materials 
Right-wing adherence. We used three distinct measures (conservatism, RWA, 
SDO) to assess right-wing adherence. To assess political conservatism, a 3-item measure 
(α = .89) from Skitka et al. (2002) was used (Appendix C). Participants responded to 
items such as “How liberal or conservative do you tend to be when it comes to social 
policy?” using a 7-point Likert scale (1= very liberal, 7 = very conservative). To assess 
 SHAPING RESPONSES 20  
RWA, a shortened 12-item measure (α = .89) adapted from Altemeyer (1996) was used 
(e.g., “What our country really needs, instead of more ‘civil rights’ is a stiff dose of law 
and order”, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; Appendix D). To assess SDO, the 
SDO7-short 8-item measure (α = .80) from Ho et al. (2015) was used (e.g., “Some groups 
of people are simply inferior to other groups”, 1 = strongly oppose 7 = strongly favour; 
Appendix E).  
Media use and trust. To assess media preferences (use; trust), participants 
indicated the extent to which they used news sources derived from the results of Study 
1a, as well as several additional sources (Appendix F), on a 6-point scale (1 = haven’t 
heard of, 6 = very often use). If a participant indicated that he/she had heard of the source 
(i.e., did not choose a 1), then they were asked how much they trusted the source (1= 
completely distrust, 7 = completely trust). Using the scores from the sources identified to 
be conservative in Study 1a, I computed an average score of conservative news use (α = 
.80) and conservative news trust (α = .80) for each participant. As such, conservative 
news use (or trust) scores consist of the average use (or trust) of FOX News, Sun News, 
National Post, Forbes, Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Globe and Mail, CNN, CBS, 
Global News, and Maclean’s respectively. Using scores from sources identified as liberal 
in Study 1a, I created an average score of liberal news use (α = .79) and liberal news trust 
(α = .80) for each participant. As such, liberal news use (or trust) consisted of the average 
use (or trust) of the Guardian, CBC, Buzzfeed, New Yorker Magazine, PBS, Huffington 
Post Canada, Huffington Post, Real Time with Bill Maher, NPR, the Daily Show, and 
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver.  
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Group attitudes. Participants completed the Modern Racism Scale (α = .88), 
initially developed to tap anti-Black attitudes (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981), but 
adapted to tap anti-Muslim attitudes. Included were items such as “Muslims should not 
push themselves where they are not wanted” (1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree; 
Appendix G). Participants also completed a 3-item measure of attitudes towards Syrian 
refugees (α = .92) created for the purpose of this study. These items include “Canadians 
will be put at risk if we allow more Syrian refugees into the country,” “Allowing greater 
numbers of Syrian refugees into Canada will NOT make our country more dangerous,” 
(reverse-coded) and “Allowing greater numbers of Syrian refugees in the country will 
pose a threat to Canada’s national security” (1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree; 
Appendix H). They then completed a 4-item measure of terrorism imminence beliefs (α = 
.79) adapted from Cox and Cheyne (2000), which included items such as “I am rarely 
worried about terrorist attacks in Canada.” (reverse-coded; 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree; Appendix I). 
Demographics. Participants indicated their age, gender, ethnic background, and 
religion. Participants also indicated whether they are a Canadian citizen and if they 
currently reside in Canada. The full demographic measure can be found in Appendix J.  
Results 
Examination of the main model variables revealed four outliers: three scores 
greater than three standard deviations above the mean on SDO, conservative news use, 
and conservative news trust respectively, and one score greater than three standard 
deviations below the mean on liberal news trust. These scores were winsorized (i.e., 
converted to the value at 3 SD above or below the mean). Missing data (0 to 2.5% for 
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each variable) were estimated using FIML (full information maximum likelihood) in 
Mplus v.7.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 2015). 
Zero-Order Correlations among Variables 
 Table 2 displays the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations 
among the main variables in the model. Measures of right-wing adherence (conservatism, 
RWA, SDO) were all positively correlated with each other, as expected (rs = .48-.56). 
Each measure of right-wing adherence was positively correlated with conservative news 
trust (but not use), and negatively correlated with liberal news use and trust. As such, 
liberals and conservatives did not differ in reliance on conservative news (meaning that 
even liberals consumed such sources), but did differ in reliance on liberal news (such that 
conservatives avoided it and liberals consumed it). All news use and trust variables were 
positively correlated, except conservative news trust was not related to liberal news use. 
Liberal news use and trust were negatively correlated with anti-Muslim prejudice, 
negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, and terrorism imminence beliefs, whereas 
conservative news use and trust were unassociated with these variables at the bivariate 
level. As anticipated, all three criteria (anti-Muslim attitudes, terrorism imminence 
beliefs, and negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees) were positively correlated with 
each other (rs = .40-.64). With values in this range, the criteria are related but not 
redundant.
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among Variables (Study 1b) 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1. Conservatism                    
2. RWA 0.56 ***                  
3. SDO 0.48 *** 0.50 ***                
4. Con. News Use 0.10  0.06  0.14 ‡              
5. Con. News Trust 0.18 * 0.32 *** 0.17 * 0.42 ***            
6. Lib. News Use -0.27 *** -0.44 *** -0.25 *** 0.49 *** -0.04           
7. Lib. News Trust -0.27 ** -0.23 *** -0.34 *** 0.18 * 0.28 *** 0.53 ***        
8. Anti-Muslim Att. 0.46 *** 0.50 *** 0.47 *** 0.05  0.02  -0.34 *** -0.33 ***      
9. Terrorism IB 0.31 *** 0.37 *** 0.35 *** 0.03  0.08  -0.21 ** -0.24 *** 0.40 ***    
10.Anti-Refugee Att. 0.57 *** 0.45 *** 0.50 *** -0.03  0.09  -0.37 *** -0.26 *** 0.64 *** 0.55 ***  
M 2.95  2.34  2.39  2.79  4.03  2.84  4.36  1.79  3.07  2.33 
SD 1.46   1.23   1.13   0.65   0.83   0.77   0.72   0.72   1.05   1.29 
Note. RWA = right-wing authoritarianism, SDO = social dominance orientation, Con. = conservative, Lib = liberal, anti-Muslim att.  = 
anti-Muslim attitudes, anti-refugee att. = negative attitudes toward Syrian refuges, IB = imminence beliefs. Possible range for 
conservatism, RWA, SDO, and news trust is 1 to 7.  Possible range for news use is 1 to 6.  Possible range for anti-Muslim attitudes, 
terrorism imminence beliefs, and negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees is 1 to 5. ‡ p < .07, * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Model Tests 
 Using Mplus v.7.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 2015), maximum likelihood estimation 
was employed to test the hypothesized models. Although the measures of right-wing 
adherence are related, they are typically regarded and treated as conceptually distinct 
constructs (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996, 1998; Crowson et al., 2005; see also Choma et al., 
2010). As such, conservativism, RWA, and SDO were entered as predictors in separate 
analyses. Liberal and conservative news use and trust were entered simultaneously as 
mediators, and terrorism imminence beliefs, anti-Muslim prejudice, and anti-refugee 
prejudice were entered simultaneously as criteria. All models were fully saturated (df = 
0); residuals of mediators and outcomes were allowed to covary. Across analyses, 
correlations between residuals ranged from -.13 to .53 (ps ranged from .80 to < .001).1 
Parameter estimates and significance tests were based on bias-corrected estimates 
generated from 1,000 bootstrap samples (see Shrout & Bolger, 2002). 
 Figures 2, 3, and 4 display results for the conservatism, RWA, and SDO models 
respectively. In each model, each measure of right-wing adherence directly predicted 
more anti-Muslim attitudes, more negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, and greater 
belief in an imminent terrorist attack. In all models, greater right-wing adherence 
predicted greater trust of conservative news sources, and less use and trust of liberal 
sources. In the SDO model, greater right-wing adherence was also marginally associated 
with more conservative news use. Greater conservative news use was associated with 
                                                          
1 Across models there were large residual correlations between liberal news use and trust 
(rs range from .41 to .46, ps < .001), conservative news use and trust (rs range from .49 
to .50, ps < .001), and moderate-to-large residual correlations between anti-Muslim 
attitudes, terrorism imminence beliefs and negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees (rs 
range from .24 to .51, ps < .001).  
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more anti-Muslim prejudice in all three models.2 Critically, in all three models, greater 
liberal news use was associated with less anti-Muslim attitudes, and less negative 
attitudes toward Syrian refugees. Greater trust in liberal news also predicted lower 
terrorism imminence beliefs in the conservatism (marginal) and RWA models.  
 
Figure 2. Saturated mediation model predicting belief in a terrorist attack, prejudice 
towards Muslims and prejudice toward Syrian refugees (Study 1b). Con. = conservative, 
lib. = liberal. Standardized coefficients shown. Paths from conservatism to criteria 
represent paths with mediators included in the model (c-prime). All non-significant paths 
were retained in the model but are visually excluded. All residuals of mediators and 
outcome variables were allowed to covary. ‡ p < .07, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
                                                          
2 Greater conservative news trust was marginally associated with less anti-Muslim 
prejudice in the RWA model. However, this effect was marginal, and this association was 
not evidenced in any other model or in the bivariate correlation; I urge the reader to 
interpret this finding with caution. 
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Figure 3. Saturated mediation model predicting belief in an imminent terrorist attack, 
prejudice towards Muslims and prejudice toward Syrian refugees (Study 1b). RWA = 
right-wing authoritarianism, con. = conservative, lib. = liberal. Standardized coefficients 
shown. Paths from RWA to criteria represent paths with mediators included in the model 
(c-prime). All non-significant paths were retained in the model but are visually excluded. 
All residuals of mediators and outcome variables were allowed to covary. ‡ p < .07, *p < 
.05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Figure 4. Saturated mediation model predicting belief in an imminent terrorist attack, 
prejudice towards Muslims and prejudice toward Syrian refugees (Study 1b). SDO = 
social dominance orientation, con. = conservative, lib. = liberal. Standardized coefficients 
shown. Paths from SDO to criteria represent paths with mediators included in the model 
(c-prime). All non-significant paths were retained in the model but are visually excluded. 
All residuals of mediators and outcome variables were allowed to covary. ‡ p < .07, *p < 
.05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
Table 3 shows the total effects, total indirect effects, and unique indirect effects 
for each model. In all models, the total standardized indirect effect through all mediators 
simultaneously was significant or marginal for negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees. 
There was also a total standardized indirect effect of right-wing adherence on anti-
Muslim attitudes and on terrorism imminence beliefs via media variables in the 
conservatism and SDO models. In terms of specific indirect effects, in all three models, 
there was a significant negative indirect effect of right-wing adherence on anti-Muslim 
prejudice, and negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees, through greater liberal news 
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use. There was also a marginal indirect effect of RWA on anti-Muslim attitudes through 
conservative news trust. Together these results suggest that some degree of left-right 
difference on criteria is being explained by news consumption and trust. 
Table 3  
Standardized Total, Direct and Indirect Effects for Predicting Outcome Measures 
                                                    Conservatism  RWA  SDO 
Terrorism Imminence Beliefs          
Total Effect 0.32 ***   0.37 ***   0.35 *** 
Indirect effect 0.08 *   0.04    0.08 * 
Con. News Use 0.01    0.00    0.01  
Con. News Trust 0.01    0.00    0.01  
Lib. News Use 0.02    -0.01    0.03  
Lib. News Trust 0.04    0.04    0.04  
Anti-Muslim Attitudes       
Total Effect 0.46 ***   0.50 ***   0.47 *** 
Indirect effect 0.11 **   0.08    0.11 ** 
Con. News Use 0.03    0.01    0.03  
Con. News Trust -0.03    -0.06 ‡   -0.03  
Lib. News Use 0.09 **   0.10 *   0.09 ** 
Lib. News Trust 0.02    0.02    0.01  
Negative Attitudes Toward Syrian Refugees           
Total Effect 0.57 ***   0.45 ***   0.51 *** 
Indirect effect 0.07 *   0.10 *   0.06 ‡ 
Con. News Use 0.01    0.01    0.01  
Con. News Trust -0.01    -0.02    -0.01  
Lib. News Use 0.08 **   0.11 *   0.09 ** 
Lib. News Trust -0.01      0.01      -0.03   
Note. Con. = conservative, Lib. = liberal, RWA = right-wing authoritarianism, SDO = 
social dominance orientation. ‡ p < .06, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Study 1b Discussion 
 Results from Study 1b are largely consistent with our hypotheses concerning 
whether media exposure can explain some of the left-right differences in anti-Muslim 
attitudes, negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, and terrorism imminence beliefs. In 
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all models, greater right-wing adherence was associated with more anti-Muslim attitudes, 
more anti-refugee attitudes, and greater belief in an imminent terrorist attack (H1). 
Hypothesis 2 was also largely confirmed: right-wing adherence was negatively related to 
use and trust of liberal sources like NPR, and positively related to trust (but not use) of 
conservative sources like FOX News. Hypothesis 3 was largely supported: greater liberal 
news use predicted less negative attitudes toward Muslims and Syrian refugees in all 
models. Greater liberal news trust predicted less belief in an imminent terrorist attack in 
the conservatism (marginal) and RWA models. Greater conservative news use predicted 
greater anti-Muslim attitudes in all three models.  
Hypothesis 4 was also mostly supported, as results are largely consistent with a 
mediated (or indirect) effect via media use and trust. In all models, there was a total (not 
specific) indirect effect of right-wing adherence on negative attitudes toward Syrian 
refugees via media variables (marginal in the SDO model). In the conservatism and SDO 
models, the total indirect effect of right-wing adherence on terrorism imminence beliefs 
and anti-Muslim attitudes was also significant. In terms of unique indirect effects, our 
results suggest that liberal news use consistently (negatively) mediated the relation 
between right-wing adherence and anti-Muslim attitudes, and mediated the relation 
between right-wing adherence and attitudes toward Syrian refugees. These results suggest 
that liberal news use explained approximately 20% of the relation between right-wing 
adherence and anti-Muslim attitudes across models, and 13-26% of the relation between 
right-wing adherence and attitudes towards Syrian refugees.  
 These findings are consistent with past research showing positive relations 
between right-wing adherence and anti-Muslim prejudice, prejudice towards immigrants, 
 SHAPING RESPONSES 30  
and beliefs about threat of terrorism (e.g., Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Crowson, 2009; Fasel et 
al., 2013; Hodson & Costello, 2007; Hodson et al., 2009; Ogan et al., 2014), and have a 
number of important implications. First, my findings suggest that liberals and 
conservatives in Canada tend to select and trust different types of news media, with 
greater right-wing adherence being associated with less use and trust of sources such as 
CBC, Huffington Post, and the Guardian, and greater trust of sources such as CNN, FOX 
News, Sun News, USA today, and Global News. This finding is largely consistent with 
preferences of American Republicans and Democrats (de Zuniga et al., 2012; Pew 
Research Center, 2014b), but with some differences. For instance, in the USA, CNN is 
particularly trusted by individuals with centrist political ideology (e.g., Pew Research, 
2014b), whereas among Canadians, this source is more associated with a conservative 
ideology. This finding is consistent with the notion that, in some ways, Canadian 
conservativism is less right-wing than American conservatism (The Political Spectrum 
2016a, 2016b). 
Further, my findings suggest that news preferences are associated with attitudes 
towards Muslims, Syrian refugees, and beliefs about terrorism. In particular, more 
conservative news use predicts more negative attitudes towards Muslims. In contrast, 
more liberal news use is associated with less negative attitudes towards Muslims and 
Syrian refugees, and more liberal news trust is associated with less belief in an imminent 
terrorist attack. This finding extends past work in the United States showing associations 
between use of specific news sources and attitudes towards Mexican immigrants, as well 
as associations between news media preferences and beliefs about climate change in the 
USA (de Zuniga et al., 2012). Moreover, my findings are consistent with the notion that 
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differences in social attitudes between leftists and rightists can, in part, be explained by 
differences in news media use and trust. Nonetheless, several of the liberal sources 
considered (e.g., Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, Real Time with Bill Maher) 
feature a comedic or satirical element to news delivery. As such, it is possible that the 
humourous aspect of these sources may lower negative attitudes regarding Muslims, 
Syrian refugees, and Islamist terrorism. The experimental design employed in Study 2 
will help to rule out this potential explanation.  
Further, the correlational design employed in Study 1 allowed us to tap naturally 
occurring levels of right-wing adherence, news use and trust, and various attitudes and 
beliefs, which suited my goals. However, the causal direction implied (i.e., news 
exposure driving group attitudes) cannot be definitively asserted with this type of design 
(Fiedler, Schott, & Meiser, 2011). As such, alternative models are possible (see Fiedler et 
al., 2011). For instance, it is possible that use and trust of news sources do not cause 
negative attitudes regarding Muslims, Syrian refugees, and terrorism, but rather ideology 
causes both attitudes and news source preferences, or that pre-existing attitudes toward 
Muslims etc., predict news use. To address these possibilities and examine causation, 
Study 2 uses an experimental design. To the best of my knowledge, no previous research 
has examined the impact of experimentally-induced liberal versus conservative news 
exposure on outgroup attitudes.  
 Moreover, it is presently unclear why news source preferences would explain the 
relation between right-wing adherence and terrorism-related attitudes. For instance, does 
watching more conservative news sources promote greater fear or anger regarding ISIS, 
with these emotions explaining more negative outgroup attitudes? Study 2 directly 
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explored this question by examining emotional responses to news media regarding 
terrorism.  
Study 2 
 Whereas Study 1b emphasized the goal of explaining left-right differences in 
thinking about terrorism and outgroups through media exposure, Study 2 sought to 
manipulate news media exposure to better test its causal effect on group attitudes and 
thoughts about terrorism. Study 2 also introduced an examination of why media exposure 
might have such effects. Figure 5 shows the hypothesized model for the proposed study. 
In this study, exposure to media was manipulated such that participants were exposed to 
video clips on terrorism from conservative news sources, video clips on terrorism from 
liberal news sources, or control videos unrelated to terrorism (sports commentary).  
Study 1b suggested that exposure to liberal news is associated with less negative 
outgroup reactions; in an experimental context, therefore, it was expected that 
manipulated exposure to terrorism-related news will follow this trend. That is, it was 
expected that the control condition would elicit the least negative social attitudes, the 
liberal-terrorism news condition would elicit more negative attitudes (relative to the 
control), and the conservative-terrorism condition would elicit the most negative attitudes 
(relative to both other conditions). I also examined whether heightened negative affect 
(fear and anger) explains or mediates the relation between news exposure and attitudes 
and beliefs surrounding terrorism. Further, I retained the predictive role of right-wing 
adherence, but given that participants are randomly assigned to experimental conditions, I 
examined right-wing adherence as a moderator of the relation between media exposure 
and negative emotions. Finally, I added a measure of military support to combat terrorism 
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(e.g., bombings) in order to assess participants desire to attack terrorists and Middle 
Eastern countries. 
 
Figure 5. Conceptual moderated mediation model predicting belief in an imminent 
terrorist attack, anti-Muslim prejudice, prejudice toward Syrian refugees, and support for 
military action against terrorism (Study 2). Paths from media condition refer to the 
conservative-terrorism news condition relative to both the liberal-terrorism news 
condition and the control condition, and the liberal-terrorism news condition relative to 
the control condition. For simplicity, the conceptual figure concentrates on the 
conservative vs. liberal and conservative vs. control contrasts. Paths from condition to 
criteria represent paths with mediators included in the model (c-prime). Measures of 
right-wing adherence include conservatism, right-wing authoritarianism and social 
dominance orientation. Residuals were allowed to covary, but paths are not shown here 
for brevity. 
 
The Role of News Media in Fostering Attitudes 
 Past correlational work suggests that greater use of conservative (vs. liberal) news 
is associated with greater denial of a human role in climate change, and more negative 
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attitudes towards immigrants (de Zuniga et al., 2012; Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016; Li et al., 
2016). Findings from Study 1b extends this work, and suggests that greater use of 
conservative sources is associated with more anti-Muslim prejudice. In contrast, greater 
use of liberal sources was negatively associated with anti-refugee attitudes and anti-
Muslim attitudes, and greater trust of liberal sources was negatively associated with 
terrorism imminence beliefs. These findings are consistent with the DSMM. However, 
the DSMM suggests that news preferences are not only associated with attitudes and 
behaviour, but that media can exert a casual effect on these variables (Valkenburg & 
Peter, 2013). Given that conservative versus liberal sources tend to present news 
information in distinct ways (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011; Woods & Arthur, 2014), it is 
possible that exposure to different sources (conservative vs. liberal) differentially impacts 
attitudes and beliefs. Specifically, terrorism news from conservative sources may elicit 
more negative attitudes regarding Muslims, terrorism, and refugees. To date, no research 
to my knowledge has tested this empirical question, leaving it unclear the causal impact 
of ideologically-tinged news coverage of terrorism on outgroup attitudes and policies.   
The Hypothesized Role of Fear and Anger 
 In an attempt to explain why news preferences may drive attitudes toward 
Muslims, attitudes toward Syrian refugees, and beliefs about terrorism and military 
intervention, I again draw from the DSMM (Valkenburg & Peter, 2013). The DSMM 
suggests that media use shapes behaviour and attitudes by affecting “response states” 
such as emotional reactions. In other words, affective reactions may mediate the 
association between media use and attitudes and beliefs surrounding terrorism.  
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 The notion that media use alters affect is supported by past research showing that 
conservative and liberal news sources may differ in the emotions they elicit. For instance, 
American conservative (vs. liberal) news sources contain more “outrage speech,” or 
speech that induces anger or fear in the audience (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). For instance, 
right-leaning news media, such as FOX News and the Thom Hartmann Show, tend to 
include more insulting language, name calling, emotional display, and misrepresentative 
exaggeration, relative to left-leaning news media such as MSNBC and NBC News 
(Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). With regard to terrorism, past research found that conservative 
newspapers from the United States (e.g., Wall Street Journal) framed immigration in a 
more negative light relative to more liberal newspapers such as the New York Times. For 
instance, in Wall Street Journal (vs. New York Times), articles on immigration contain 
more words like “illegal” and “terrorism,” an effect especially strong after 9/11 (Woods 
& Arthur, 2014). Therefore, given that conservative media appears to be more negative in 
its presentation of political news content it is possible that conservative (vs. liberal) news 
elicits more negative emotions such as fear and anger regarding Islamist terrorist groups 
(i.e., ISIS).  
 The DSMM suggests that media-evoked emotional reactions predict social 
attitudes (Valkenburg & Peters, 2013). In the present context, participants are exposed to 
news media that can be potentially threatening (e.g., news on terrorism). Intergroup 
emotions theory (Smith & Mackie, 2000) suggests that when under threat, individuals 
may experience fear or anger regarding outgroups. Moreover, fear and anger may 
differentially shape individuals’ attitudes. For instance, anger is typically considered an 
“approach” emotion and fear an “avoidance” emotion. As such, these emotions tend to be 
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associated with specific consequences (e.g., Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Mackie, 
Devos, & Smith, 2000). For instance, individuals who report being afraid or anxious 
around outgroup members express stronger desire to avoid them, whereas feeling angry 
or irritated with outgroup members is associated with a stronger desire to confront or 
argue with them (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Mackie et al., 2000, Smith & Mackie, 2000).  
Largely consistent with Intergroup Emotions Theory, Skitka, Bauman, 
Aramovich, and Morgan (2006) found that, among Americans, feeling fearful in response 
to terrorist attacks is associated with greater support for deportation of Arab Americans, 
Muslims, and first generation immigrants, as well as greater perceptions of terrorism 
threat, such as a stronger expectation of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack oneself 
(Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004). Among Canadians, feeling anxious when thinking of 
interacting with outgroup members is associated with increased prejudice toward 
Muslims (Hodson et al., 2013). Further, among Americans, feeling angry in response to 
terrorist attacks is associated with greater support for expanding the war on terrorism, 
greater outgroup derogation, and greater desire to hurt those responsible for the attacks 
(Skitka et al., 2004, 2006).  
Individual Differences and Intergroup Emotions 
 The DSMM (Valkenburg & Peter, 2013) suggests that dispositional factors not 
only predict media use, but also moderate the relation between media use and emotional 
reactions. Past research supports this idea, given that American liberals and conservatives 
have been reported to differ in their emotional responses to threatening stimuli, such as 
images of angry faces (McLean et al., 2014) and dangerous animals (Dodd et al., 2012; 
see also Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014). Therefore, given that news media has the 
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potential to elicit negative affect (e.g., Sobieraj & Berry, 2011), the relation between 
news use and emotional responses to terrorism may depend on (or be moderated by) 
degree of right-wing adherence. Research examining liberals’ and conservatives’ 
emotional reactions to threatening stimuli, such as terrorist attacks, often draw from one 
of two broad theoretical approaches, each of which leads to a unique pattern of 
predictions regarding how liberals and conservatives may react to news media on 
terrorism.  
 Conservative sensitivity hypothesis. In general, greater conservativism is 
associated with heightened reactivity to emotion-laden stimuli, including positive (e.g., 
flowers, children) and negative images (e.g., dangerous animals, mutilation, jail; Tritt, 
Peterson, Page-Gould, & Inzlicht, 2016). In particular, most researchers emphasize the 
relation between right-wing adherence and heightened negative emotional reactions, such 
as fear or anger, felt in response to threat. For instance, greater right-wing adherence is 
associated with greater negativity bias, including greater responsiveness to threatening 
stimuli (Hibbing et al., 2014). For example, conservatives (vs. liberals) tend to show 
heightened physiological reactions to negative facial expressions, show a stronger 
tendency to recall negative information, and are more likely to notice threatening stimuli 
(Hibbing et al., 2014). Among Americans, greater right-wing adherence is also associated 
with higher death anxiety, greater belief that one’s way of life is being threatened, and 
heightened perceptions that the world is a dangerous place (Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2007; 
Perry, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2013). 
In the intergroup domain, among Polish participants, conservatives (vs. liberals) 
have previously expressed more hostility towards groups (Arabs, Muslims) that are 
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perceived to threaten national safety (De Zavala, Cislak, & Wesoloska, 2010). Similarly, 
among North American and European participants, higher (vs. lower) RWA is associated 
with more hostility towards groups that threaten traditional norms and values (Duckitt, 
2006; Hodson et al., 2009). Moreover, greater SDO is associated with heightened threat 
perceptions regarding immigrants (Esses, Hodson, & Dovidio, 2003; Hodson et al., 2009) 
and ethnic minorities (Onraet & Van Hiel, 2013). Further, past research has found that 
among Israeli participants, greater conservativism is associated with greater anxiety and 
hostility regarding terrorist attacks (Laufer & Solomon, 2010).  
Thus, there is considerable evidence that right-wing (vs. left-wing) adherents tend 
to express more negative intergroup affect and react more strongly to threatening stimuli 
(for summary, see Hibbing et al., 2014). In the context of the current study, these findings 
suggest that as negative emotion regarding ISIS elicited by the news source increases, so 
will right- (vs. left) wing adherents’ negative reactions. Thus, this perspective suggests: 
(a) an increase in negative affect regarding ISIS after watching liberal news on terrorism, 
relative to watching sports news (control); and (b) an increase in negative affect regarding 
ISIS after watching conservative news on terrorism relative to watching liberal news on 
terrorism and relative to control videos. Moreover, if the conservative-sensitivity 
hypothesis is correct, these patterns should be more pronounced among those higher (vs. 
lower) in right-wing adherence. This possible pattern is illustrated in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. A hypothetical relation between news condition and negative affect (fear or 
anger), as moderated by right-wing adherence (Study 2). Prediction based on the 
conservative sensitivity hypothesis. Right-wing = personal right-wing adherence 
(conservatism, RWA, SDO). Control condition = sports commentary, liberal = news on 
terrorism from liberal sources, conservative= news on terrorism from conservative 
sources. 
 
Reactive-liberals hypothesis. Alternatively, differences in left- and right-wing 
adherents’ emotional responses to news on terrorism may show evidence of the reactive-
liberals hypothesis (Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 2009). System 
justification theory suggests that individuals, and particularly right-wing (vs. left-wing) 
adherents, are motivated to perceive existing social, economic, and political systems as 
fair and legitimate (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008; Jost & van der Toorn, 2012). However, 
particular situations may increase left-wing adherents’ tendency to engage in system 
justifying tendencies of the sort common on the right (Jost & van der Toorn, 2012). For 
instance, when experiencing fear, threat, or uncertainty, liberals may be motivated to 
adopt a more conservative worldview that emphasizes the legitimacy of existing social 
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systems. Consider that, when American liberals are exposed to threatening stimuli, they 
show an increase in ingroup (i.e., own group) favouritism that matches the level 
expressed by conservatives, which is relatively high for right-wing adherents regardless 
of whether they are exposed to the threat (Nail et al., 2009; for related findings, see 
Bonanno & Jost, 2007; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Jost, Fitzsimmons, & Kay, 2004).  
Evidence for the reactive-liberals hypothesis has also been observed in responses 
to outgroups. For instance, following a terror attack, Spaniards showed an increase in 
conservative beliefs and greater anti-Arab attitudes (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernandez-
Guede, 2006; for similar results regarding increases in conservative beliefs following 
threatening arguments regarding immigrants, see Craig & Richeson, 2013). Similarly, 
prior to a terrorist attack in the United Kingdom, liberals expressed significantly less 
prejudice towards Muslims and immigrants relative to conservatives. However, following 
a terrorist attack, liberals expressed greater anti-Muslim prejudice, which brought their 
attitudes closer to those of conservatives, whose prejudice did not increase following the 
attack (Van de Vyver, Houston, Abrams, & Vasiljevic, 2016). In such cases, left-wing 
adherents have more “room to move” toward negative emotion-based responses (fear and 
anger) and group attitudes relative to right-wing adherents (who are already relatively 
high in such emotions in a variety of domains and social attitudes at their baseline).  
 Given that negative emotions (e.g., fear, anger) can drive negative group attitudes, 
it is therefore possible that leftists experience a negative shift in attitudes when under 
threat because they experience an increase in negative affect. For instance, when Israeli 
participants were made to feel despair, liberals showed less support for removing a 
barrier between regions occupied by Israelis and Palestinians. In contrast, conservatives 
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showed low support for removing the barrier at baseline, and their support did not 
decrease further following the emotion manipulation. Thus, increases in despair made 
liberals more similar to conservatives in their attitudes (Pliskin, Bar-Tal, Sheppes, & 
Halperin, 2014). Similar results were found when participants were made to experience 
anger and fear, in that conservatives consistently showed lower support for intergroup co-
operation regardless of the manipulation, whereas liberals showed significantly less 
support for intergroup co-operation after attempts were made to increase these negative 
emotions. 
  These findings suggest that exposure to threatening stimuli, such as news 
coverage on terrorism, may result in an affective shift among those with a more leftist 
ideology (i.e., those with more “room to move”). Presumably, the more negative emotion 
regarding ISIS elicited by the news source, the closer left-leaning individuals will become 
to their right-leaning counterparts, whose negative affect regarding ISIS should be 
relatively high in all conditions. In other words, from the reactive-liberals hypothesis 
perspective, those lower (vs. higher) in right-wing adherence may experience more 
negative affect regarding ISIS after watching liberal-terrorism news relative to watching 
sports news (control), and more negative affect regarding ISIS after watching 
conservative-terrorism news relative to watching liberal-terrorism news or sports news, 
given that conservative-terrorism news is more threatening. In contrast, negative affect 
regarding ISIS should be high among those higher (vs. lower) in right-wing adherence 
regardless of media salience. This possible pattern is illustrated in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. A hypothetical relation between news condition and negative affect (fear or 
anger), as moderated by right-wing adherence (Study 2). This pattern is consistent with 
the reactive-liberals hypothesis. Right-wing = personal right-wing adherence 
(conservatism, RWA, SDO). Control condition = sports commentary, liberal = news on 
terrorism from liberal sources, conservative= news on terrorism from conservative 
sources. 
 
In short, there were at least two competing theoretical perspectives that can speak 
directly to the potential outcome in Study 2. The conservative sensitivity hypothesis 
(Hibbing et al. 2014) suggests that, due to greater threat sensitivity, right-wing (vs. left-
wing) adherents should be particularly sensitive to the threat-messages in conservative 
(vs. liberal) media, and react strongly with fear and anger regarding ISIS. In contrast, the 
reactive-liberals hypothesis (Nail et al., 2009) suggests that right-wing (vs. left-wing) 
adherents at baseline are relatively reactive to potential threats, and that their right-
leaning political orientation is a function of their epistemic needs (e.g., for 
order/structure), existential motives (loss prevention; terror management), and ideological 
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motives (e.g., group-based dominance, system justification). As such, those on the right 
have less room to move following media exposure emphasizing threats, and it is liberals 
(vs. conservatives) who may particularly exhibit increased fear and anger regarding ISIS 
in response to such media. In essence, the first proposition is that conservative media 
fuels conservative fears and lashing outward, whereas the second is that conservative 
media makes liberals more fearful and angry regarding outgroups. This study is the first 
known study to pit these hypotheses against each other.  
Overview and Hypotheses 
 Results from Study 1b demonstrated that conservative (vs. liberal) news use and 
trust was associated with more anti-Muslim attitudes, more anti-refugee attitudes, and 
greater belief in an imminent terrorist attack. In Study 2, I explicitly tested the causal 
relation between news use and these group attitudes by randomly assigning participants 
to watch video clips with audio on terrorism and refugees from conservative news 
sources (conservative-terrorism condition), liberal news sources (liberal-terrorism 
condition), or sports news (control condition). I also tested whether heightened negative 
affect explains why conservative-terrorism news may elicit more negative attitudes 
relative to liberal-terrorism news, and why liberal-terrorism news may elicit more 
negative attitudes relative to the control. I focused on fear and anger given these 
emotions’ past associations with anti-Muslim prejudice, anti-immigrant prejudice, and 
beliefs about terrorism (e.g., Laufer & Solomon, 2010; Skitka et al., 2004, 2006). I also 
explored whether the relations between news exposure and negative affect are moderated 
by political ideology, pitting two competing hypotheses against each other (conservative 
sensitivity hypothesis shown in Figure 6 vs. reactive-liberals hypothesis shown in Figure 
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7). Finally, given that anger is an approach-relevant emotion (e.g., Carver & Harmon-
Jones, 2009; Mackie et al., 2000), I included a measure of support for military action 
against terrorism (e.g., bombings) with the criteria from Study 1. As such, I proposed the 
following hypotheses (Figure 5): 
H1: Keeping in mind that, despite being a liberal source type, content nonetheless 
covers terrorism, I hypothesized that those in the liberal-terrorism news condition 
will report more anti-Muslim prejudice, more anti-refugee prejudice, greater 
belief in an imminent terrorist attack, and greater support for military action 
against terrorism, relative to participants the control condition (H1a). Further, 
given past research suggesting that conservative (vs. liberal) news uses more 
threatening language and tone, those in the conservative-terrorism news condition 
were expected to report more negative attitudes, greater belief in an imminent 
attack, and greater military support relative to participants in both other conditions 
(H1b). This hypothesis corresponds to the c-path in the model (i.e., from 
manipulation to criteria).  
H2: I predicted that the type of videos watched will predict fear and anger 
regarding ISIS, such that the control condition will elicit the least fear and anger, 
the liberal-terrorism news condition will elicit more fear and anger relative to the 
control, and the conservative-terrorism news condition will elicit the most fear 
and anger relative to either of the other two conditions. This hypothesis 
corresponds to the a-path in the conceptual model (i.e., from manipulation to 
mediators). 
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H3: Greater fear and anger regarding terrorism will be associated with more anti-
refugee attitudes, greater belief in an imminent attack, greater military support, 
and more anti-Muslim attitudes. This hypothesis corresponds to the b-path in the 
conceptual model (i.e., from mediators to criteria).3 
H4: There will be an indirect effect of media exposure on group attitudes and 
beliefs about terrorism imminence and military intervention through fear and 
anger. 
H5: The relation between experimental news condition and affective reactions 
will be moderated by political ideology (conservatism, RWA, SDO). This 
corresponds to a moderated a-path in the model (from manipulation to mediators). 
To the extent that the conservative sensitivity hypothesis is correct, those higher 
(vs. lower) in right-wing adherence would experience a greater increase in 
negative affect in the liberal-terrorism condition relative to the control condition, 
and a greater increase in the conservative-terrorism condition relative to the 
liberal-terrorism condition and the control condition (see Figure 6). The reactive-
liberals hypothesis, however, would predict that those higher (vs. lower) in right-
wing adherence will show high levels of fear and anger regarding terrorism across 
all conditions, whereas those lower in right-wing adherence will show greater 
increases in negative affect in the liberal-terrorism condition relative to the control 
condition, and a greater increase in fear and anger in the conservative-terrorism 
                                                          
3 Although military support may be considered a response elicited by anger (i.e. an 
“approach” response), it is unclear whether terrorism imminence beliefs, anti-Muslim 
attitudes, or anti-refugee attitudes are “approach” (elicited mainly by anger) or “avoid” 
(elicited mainly be fear) responses. As such, I do not make specific predictions regarding 
the strength of relations between anger or fear and any outcome measure. 
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condition relative to both the liberal terrorism-condition and control condition. 
(see Figure 7). H5 is thus exploratory (not directional) in nature, but critically pits 
two competing approaches to understanding threat reactions as a function of 
ideology.4 
 For exploratory purposes, I also examined the extent to which participants trust 
the video clips they were exposed to (i.e., consider them valid and reliable). Doing so 
allowed me to test whether news source trust moderates the relation between 
experimental condition and emotional reactions to terrorism (i.e., model a-paths). Further, 
I tested whether right-wing adherence moderates the relation between affective reaction 
and criteria (i.e., b-paths). This would be consistent with some past research showing that 
among North American participants, those on the left and those on the right initially 
express similar reactions to threats, but leftists are more likely to reverse these initial 
reactions so that negative affect does not translate into negative attitudes (e.g., Skitka et 
al., 2002; for similar rationale, see Hodson et al., 2013, Study 2). Finally, I also assessed 
whether source trust or right-wing ideology moderate the relation between experimental 
condition and group attitudes, terrorism imminence beliefs, and military support (i.e., the 
c-path in the model). 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
                                                          
4 This non-directional approach recognizes that the relation between ideology and threat 
is complex and nuanced (Choma & Hodson, in press), that no previous research has 
manipulated terrorism news exposure in the manner I adopted, and that the literature 
suggests that either outcome could prevail.  
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 To determine the sample size for the proposed study, an a priori power analysis 
was conducted in Mplus v7.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 2015) following the procedure 
proposed by Thoemmes, MacKinnon, and Reiser (2010). Power analyses allow 
researchers to input estimated means, variances, and path coefficients for a hypothesized 
model, in order to determine the approximate statistical power of relations among 
variables with a particular sample size. For the current study, path coefficients and 
descriptive statistics were estimated using values from Study 1b and past research using 
similar variables (e.g., de Zuniga et al., 2012; Skitka et al., 2006). This analysis revealed 
that a sample size of 375 (125 participants per condition) would yield power of .80 or 
above for the moderated effect and most total indirect effects in both news conditions.  
 Data were collected from 330 university students, with collection running until 
near the end of term.5 Eight participants were excluded for failing an attention check, and 
three were excluded due to technical error. Participants who self-categorized as Muslim, 
Syrian, or a refugee (target groups) were also excluded (n = 14). After exclusions, the 
final sample comprised of 305 participants (88.5% female, 11.5% male, Mage = 20.22, SD 
= 4.12), 71.5% of whom were White, 8.2% were Black, 14.8% were Asian, 2.0% were 
Middle Eastern, 9% were Aboriginal Peoples, and 6.3% identified as another 
race/ethnicity. As for religious identification, 53.8% of participants were Christian, 5.2% 
were Hindu, 31.8% were atheist/agnostic, and 14.1% practiced another religion.  
                                                          
5 Although we did not achieve our goal of recruiting 375 participants, it should be noted 
that variances for some variables were over-estimated in the a priori power analysis. As 
such, it is possible that fewer than expected participants were actually needed to achieve 
adequate power. Nonetheless, the results should be interpreted with power considerations 
in mind. 
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Participants were recruited from a Canadian university (Brock University) via 
SONA, a web-based research participation sign-up system, and posters placed around 
campus. The project was advertised as a study about watching videos and media 
preferences to disguise its true purpose and avoid inadvertently attracting (or deterring) 
those with particular political views or news habits (i.e., awareness of the researchers’ 
intent to examine effects of news media exposure on group attitudes and beliefs may bias 
participants’ participation rates and/or responses).  
 After providing consent, participants filled out measures of right-wing adherence 
(conservatism, RWA, SDO) presented in random order. Then participants responded to 
filler items about general media preferences (e.g., movies they prefer, how much they use 
social media, etc.), in order to hide the true purpose of the study. They were then assigned 
to one of three conditions (liberal-terrorism news, conservative-terrorism news, or control 
condition) in which they watched three short video clips. Participants then responded to 
manipulation check items assessing attentiveness to the videos, followed by a measure of 
fear and anger regarding terrorism. Participants then filled out measures of anti-Muslim 
attitudes, attitudes toward Syrian refugees, terrorism imminence beliefs, and support for 
military force to combat terrorism (e.g., bombings), which were presented in random 
order. Participants then indicated the extent to which they trusted the videos they 
watched. This item was placed near the end of the study to avoid inadvertently cuing 
critical thinking regarding bias in media before outcome measures could be assessed. 
Participants then completed demographic information, followed by a suspicion check 
meant to determine whether participants recognized the purpose of the study. Finally, 
 SHAPING RESPONSES 49  
participants were debriefed and received compensation (course credit, $2 coffee gift card, 
or a chocolate bar). 
 
 
Materials 
Right-wing adherence. Right-wing adherence was assessed via measures of 
conservatism, RWA, and SDO. Measures of conservatism (α = .88) and RWA (α = .86) 
were identical to those in Study 1b (Appendix C and D respectively). However, this study 
used the long-form measure of the recent 16-item SDO7 scale (α = .87) provided by Ho 
and colleagues (2015; Appendix K).  
Media preferences. Participants indicated the amount of time they spend 
consuming news, which platforms they use to receive news (e.g., newspapers, internet), 
how knowledgeable of current affairs they believed themselves to be, how much time 
they spend reading generally, and named four movies they enjoy. These items were only 
of peripheral interest, and thus not examined empirically; rather, their purpose was to 
suggest to participants that the study was about media preferences (not necessarily the 
effects of news exposure). See Appendix L for the full measure. 
News source manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions (see Appendix M for weblinks to videos). In each condition, participants 
watched three short video clips. These clips were taken from actual news outlets in order 
to maximize external validity. Clips for the liberal and conservative conditions were 
matched a closely as possible on objective details of news stories. Specifically, both 
conditions contained information regarding the Syrian refugee crisis including the 
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number and location of Syrian refugees, a Canadian man who re-located to Syria to fight 
for ISIS and was featured in a propaganda video in which ISIS threatens an attack on 
Canada, and the resources at ISIS’s disposal (e.g. money, land). Despite being matched 
on these details, the liberal-terrorism and conservative-terrorism news conditioned tended 
to differ in their presentation of how the threat of ISIS should be perceived and what 
actions should be taken by the Western world in response. 
In the liberal-terrorism news condition, participants watched one clip on ISIS 
funding from the Washington Post (Washington Post, 2015; 1:37 minutes long), which 
described ISIS’s sources of income, how declining oil prices have weakened ISIS, and 
how the American government is confident that ISIS will be defeated. They next watched 
a clip on Syrian refugees from the Huffington Post (Huffington Post, 2015; 1:50 minutes 
long) which described how none of the Syrian refugees admitted to the USA have been 
linked to terrorism, and how most Syrian refugees are women and children. The third clip 
originated from the CBC (The National, 2014; 2:50 minutes long), which discussed 
ISIS’s threat to Canada and described how an ISIS attack in Canada is unlikely. The total 
duration of these clips was 6 minutes 28 seconds.  
Participants assigned to the conservative-terrorism news condition watched new 
clips covering the same general topics as in the liberal condition but from different 
sources. The total duration was 6 minutes 33 seconds. The first clip originated from Sun 
News Network on ISIS funding (Sun News Network, 2015; 2:06 minutes long), which 
emphasized the wealth and power of ISIS and stated that Canada’s government should be 
taking ISIS more seriously. Another clip from FOX News covered Syrian refugees (FOX 
News, 2016; 2:07 minutes long). It explicitly linked Syrian refugees to terrorism and 
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hatred of Americans and women, and suggested that refugees should be refused 
admittance into the USA. The third clip was from Global News (Global News, 2014; 2:07 
minutes long) and described ISIS’s threat to Canada, how other governments believe that 
an ISIS attack in a western country is highly likely, and how there may be ISIS fighters 
currently residing in Canada.  
In the control condition, participants watched three clips of sports news 
commentary for a duration of 6 minutes 28 seconds. This condition included one clip 
from the NBA (NBA, 2016; 2:14 minutes long), which described the use of replay 
footage in basketball, one clip from the NFL (NFL, 2016; 1:57 minutes), which counted 
down the fastest NFL players, and one clip from the PGA (PGA Tour, 2016; 2:06 
minutes), which recapped notable shots made by golfers. These videos were chosen from 
a wider array, in consultation with my advisor (Gordon Hodson).  
Manipulation check. Following the manipulation, participants filled out two 
items assessing attentiveness to the videos (Appendix N). First, participants responded to 
a multiple choice item asking “What did the videos show?” with the following options: 
(A) sports commentary, (B) terrorism and refugees and (C and D) two filler options. If 
the participant selected option A, they were then asked to indicate which sports were 
shown (from a set of options). If the participant selected option B, they were then asked 
to indicate, using multiple choice options, which specific topics regarding terrorism or 
refugees were covered in the clips. If a participant answered at least one of these 
questions incorrectly, they were removed from analyses.  
 Fear and anger regarding ISIS. To assess affective reactions to the videos, 
participants were asked to indicate the extent to which ISIS made them feel anger and 
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outrage (2 items; α = .88) and fear and anxiety (2 items; α = .95) on a 7-point scale (1 = 
not at all, 7 = extremely; Appendix O). 
Group attitudes. To assess anti-Muslim attitudes (α = .82), belief in an imminent 
terrorist attack (α = .70), and attitudes toward Syrian refugees (α = .93), measures from 
Study 1b were employed (Appendix G, I, and H respectively). To assess military support, 
an 8-item measure adapted from Kteily, Hodson, and Bruneau (2016) was used (α = .79). 
Items include “I support continued military efforts abroad to root out potential ISIS 
terrorists,” “We are being too harsh toward ISIS,” (reverse coded) and “We should strike 
back with brutal force against members of ISIS who seek to intimidate us” (1= strongly 
disagree, 7= strongly agree; Appendix P).  
 Media trust. For exploratory purposes, participants indicated how much they 
trusted the information presented in the videos using a 7-point scale (1= completely 
distrust, 7= completely trust; Appendix Q). 
 Demographics. To determine sample characteristics, participants were asked to 
report demographic information such as their ethnicity, religion, immigrant status, and 
gender (Appendix R). 
  Suspicion check. To determine whether participants recognized the purpose of 
the study, they were asked to respond to 4 open-ended items such as “Can you guess what 
the study was about?” and “Did anything about the study make you suspicious? If yes, 
please elaborate” (Appendix S). 
Results 
 Examination of the main model variables revealed 7 outliers: two scores greater 
than three standard deviations above the mean on RWA, one score greater than three 
 SHAPING RESPONSES 53  
standard deviations above the mean on SDO, two scores greater than three standard 
deviations above the mean on anti-Muslim attitudes, and two scores greater than three 
standard deviations above the mean on military support. Outliers were winsorized 
(converted to the value at 3 SD above the mean). Missing data (0 to 4.9% for each 
variable) were estimated using FIML (full information maximum likelihood) in Mplus 
v7.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 2015). 
Zero-Order Correlations Among Model Variables 
 Table 4 displays the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations 
among the continuous variables in the model, collapsing across conditions. Measures of 
right-wing adherence (conservatism, RWA, SDO) were all positively correlated with 
each other (rs = .36-49), as were all criteria (negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees, 
anti-Muslim attitudes, support for military action against terrorism, and terrorism 
imminence beliefs) (rs = .17-60). All measures of right-wing adherence were positively 
associated with negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, anti-Muslim attitudes, 
terrorism imminence beliefs (marginal association with conservatism), and support for 
military action.  
In addition, ISIS-relevant fear and anger were positively associated with each 
other (r = .40). Measures of right-wing adherence (i.e., conservatism, RWA, SDO) were 
weakly associated with fear and anger regarding terrorism. Fear and anger were both 
positively associated with attitudes towards Syrian refugees, support for military action 
against terrorism, and terrorism imminence beliefs. Neither fear nor anger was 
significantly associated with attitudes towards Muslims.   
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Source trust was positively and significantly associated with all measures of right-
wing adherence and support for military action against terrorism. Source trust was also 
(marginally) positively associated with anti-Muslim attitudes. 
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Table 4  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among Continuous Variables (Study 2) 
Note. RWA = right-wing authoritarianism, SDO = social dominance orientation, Anti-Muslim Att. = anti-Muslim attitudes, Anti- 
Refugee Att. = negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees, IB = imminence beliefs. Possible range for conservatism, RWA, SDO, fear, 
anger, military support, and source trust is 1 to 7.  Possible range for anti-Muslim attitudes, terrorism imminence beliefs, and negative 
attitudes toward Syrian refugees is 1 to 5. ‡ p < .07 * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
1. Conservatism                    
2. RWA .49 ***                  
3. SDO .36 *** .44 ***                
4. Fear (ISIS) .11 ‡ .12 * -.03               
5. Anger (ISIS) .00  .00  -.11 ‡ .40 ***            
6. Anti-Refugee Att. .30 *** .38 *** .40 *** .15 * .11 *          
7. Anti-Muslim Att.  .40 *** .49 *** .55 *** .02  .01  .60 ***        
8. Military Support .26 *** .31 *** .32 *** .23 *** .31 *** .53 *** .49 ***      
9. Terrorism IB .10 ‡ .14 * .12 * .36 *** .22 *** .40 *** .17 ** .32 ***    
10. Source Trust .23 *** .22 *** .15 * .15 * .05  .11  .11 ‡ .18 ** .04   
M 3.55  2.93  2.55  4.52  5.08  2.48  2.04  3.30  3.06  4.85 
SD 1.30   1.02   0.87   1.79   1.59   1.18   0.73   0.81   0.82   1.43 
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Model Tests   
In order to test the hypothesized models, I used maximum likelihood estimation 
via Mplus v7.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 2015). Experimental condition was entered as the 
exogenous predictor, measures of affect (anger and fear) were entered as mediators, and 
group attitudes (anti-Muslim attitudes, anti-refugee attitudes, terrorism imminence 
beliefs, and military support) were entered as criteria. Experimental condition was first 
dummy coded such that the control condition was the reference group, in order to 
compare the liberal condition to the control condition, and the conservative condition to 
the control condition, on relevant criteria. Then, in follow up model tests, experimental 
condition was re-coded such that the liberal condition was the reference group, in order to 
compare the liberal condition to the conservative condition on relevant criteria (see 
Hardy, 1993).  
As in Study 1, I tested separate models for conservatism, RWA, and SDO. In each 
case, the measure of right-wing-adherence was specified as the moderator of the path 
between experimental condition and fear, and on the path between experimental 
condition and anger. All models are fully saturated (df = 0); residuals of mediators and 
outcomes were allowed to covary. Across analyses, correlations between residuals ranged 
from .16 to .63 (ps ranged from .008 to < .001).6 Parameter estimates and significance 
tests are based on bias-corrected estimates generated from 1,000 bootstrap samples. Table 
                                                          
6 Across models, there were large residual correlations between fear and anger regarding 
ISIS (rs = .40, ps < .001), and between negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, anti-
Muslim attitudes, and military support (rs range from .52 to .63, ps < .001). Residuals of 
terrorism imminence beliefs were moderately correlated with residuals of anti-Muslim 
attitudes, negative Syrian refugee attitudes, and military support (rs range from .16 to .37, 
ps range from .008 to < .001). 
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5 shows the path coefficients for each model, and Table 6 shows the total and indirect 
effects in each model.
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Table 5  
Saturated Moderated Mediation Models Predicting Criteria (Study 2) 
    conservatism     RWA   SDO 
  B   SE β   B   SE β    B   SE β   
Fear (ISIS)                  
DC1  0.49 * 0.24 0.13 *  0.50 * 0.25 0.13 *  0.50 * 0.25 0.13 * 
DC2  0.51 ‡ 0.26 0.13 ‡  0.60 * 0.26 0.15 *  0.60 * 0.26 0.16 * 
ideology  0.15  0.16 0.11   0.20  0.18 0.11   -0.07  0.23 -0.03  
DC1Xideo  -0.10  0.18 -0.04   0.21  0.25 0.06   0.10  0.30 0.03  
DC2Xideo  0.09  0.23 0.04   -0.15  0.28 -0.06   0.06  0.35 0.02  
Anger (ISIS)                
DC1  0.16  0.23 0.05   0.12  0.24 0.04   0.14  0.24 0.04  
DC2  0.33  0.24 0.10   0.37  0.23 0.11   0.34  0.24 0.10  
ideology  0.21  0.15 0.17   0.28  0.17 0.18   0.08  0.21 0.05  
DC1Xideo  -0.35  0.19 -0.17   -0.32  0.28 -0.11   -0.44  0.30 -0.13  
DC2Xideo   -0.27   0.18 -0.12     -0.46 ‡ 0.24 -0.19 ‡   -0.38   0.28 -0.12   
Anti-Refugee Attitudes                
DC1  -0.21  0.16 -0.08   -0.25  0.16 -0.10   -0.25  0.16 -0.10  
DC2  0.33 * 0.16 0.13 *  0.34 * 0.16 0.13 *  0.34 * 0.16 0.13 * 
fear  0.10 * 0.05 0.14 *  0.08 ‡ 0.05 0.13 ‡  0.08  0.05 0.13  
anger  0.03  0.05 0.04   0.04  0.05 0.05   0.04  0.05 0.05  
Anti-Muslim Attitudes                               
DC1  -0.05  0.09 -0.04   -0.06  0.10 -0.04   -0.06  0.10 -0.04  
DC2  0.12  0.11 0.08   0.12  0.11 0.08   0.12  0.11 0.08  
 SHAPING RESPONSES 59  
fear  0.00  0.03 0.00   0.01  0.03 0.02   0.01  0.03 0.02  
anger  0.00  0.03 -0.01   0.00  0.03 -0.01   0.00  0.03 -0.01  
Military Support                               
DC1  0.17  0.11 0.10   0.12  0.11 0.07   0.12  0.11 0.07  
DC2  0.18  0.11 0.11   0.17  0.11 0.10   0.17  0.11 0.10  
fear  0.05  0.03 0.11   0.05  0.03 0.11   0.05  0.03 0.11  
anger   0.13 *** 0.04 0.27 ***   0.13 *** 0.04 0.26 ***   0.13 *** 0.04 0.26 *** 
Terrorism Imminence Beliefs                
DC1  0.07  0.10 0.04   0.05  0.10 0.03   0.05  0.10 0.03  
DC2  0.40 *** 0.11 0.23 ***  0.38 ** 0.11 0.22 ***  0.38 ** 0.11 0.22 *** 
fear  0.15 *** 0.03 0.32 ***  0.14 *** 0.03 0.30 ***  0.14 *** 0.03 0.30 *** 
anger   0.04   0.03 0.08     0.04   0.03 0.08     0.04   0.03 0.08   
Note. Saturated moderated mediation model predicting negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, anti-Muslim prejudice, support for 
military action against terrorism, and terrorism imminence beliefs via fear and anger regarding ISIS. DC1 compares liberal-terrorism 
news condition against the control condition. DC2 compares conservative-terrorism news condition against control the condition. 
RWA = right-wing authoritarianism, SDO = social dominance orientation, ideo = ideology. Conservatism, RWA, and SDO models 
tested separately. ‡ p < .07, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table 6 
Standardized Total and Indirect Effects for Predicting Outcome Measures (Study 2) 
    Conservatism   RWA     SDO   
Anti-Refugee Attitudes        
DC1  SR          
Total Effect  -0.06   -0.08   -0.08  
Indirect Effect  0.02   0.02   0.02  
Fear  0.02   0.02   0.02  
Anger  0.00   0.00   0.00  
DC2  SR          
Total Effect  0.15 *  0.16 *  0.16 * 
Indirect Effect  0.02   0.03   0.02  
Fear  0.02   0.02   0.02  
Anger   0.00     0.01     0.01  
Anti-Muslim Attitudes        
DC1  MRS          
Total Effect  -0.04   -0.04   -0.04  
Indirect Effect  0.00   0.00   0.00  
Fear  0.00   0.00   0.00  
Anger  0.00   0.00   0.00  
DC2  MRS          
Total Effect  0.07   0.08   0.08  
Indirect Effect  0.00   0.00   0.00  
Fear  0.00   0.00   0.00  
Anger   0.00     0.00     0.00   
Military Support        
DC1  MS          
Total Effect  0.12 ‡  0.09   0.09  
Indirect Effect  0.03   0.02   0.03  
Fear  0.01   0.02   0.02  
Anger  0.01   0.01   0.01  
DC2  MS          
Total Effect  0.14 *  0.14 *  0.14 * 
Indirect Effect  0.04   0.05 *  0.04 ‡ 
Fear  0.01   0.02   0.02  
Anger   0.03     0.03     0.03   
Terrorism Imminence Beliefs        
DC1  TIB          
Total Effect  0.09   0.07   0.07  
Indirect Effect  0.05   0.04 ‡  0.04  
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Fear  0.04 ‡  0.04 ‡  0.04 ‡ 
Anger  0.00   0.00   0.00  
DC2  TIB          
Total Effect  0.28 ***  0.27 ***  0.27 *** 
Indirect Effect  0.05 ‡  0.06 *  0.06 * 
Fear  0.04   0.05 *  0.05 * 
Anger   0.01     0.01     0.01   
Note. RWA = right-wing authoritarianism, SDO = social dominance orientation. SR = 
Negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, MRS = anti-Muslim attitudes, MS = military 
support, TIB = terrorism imminence beliefs. DC1 pits liberal-terrorism news condition 
against control. DC2 pits conservative-terrorism news condition against control. ‡ p < 
.07, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Conservatism model. Path coefficients for the political conservatism model can be 
seen in Table 5. Participants in the conservative terrorism (vs. control) condition reported 
more anti-refugee attitudes and greater terrorism imminence beliefs, as expected. In 
contrast, there were no significant differences between the liberal condition and the 
control condition for any of the criteria. Thus, conservative (but not liberal) news 
exposure on terrorism generated more negative attitudes toward Muslims and elevated the 
sense that a terrorist attack is imminent.  
ISIS-relevant fear was modestly stronger in the liberal and the conservative (vs. 
control) conditions. ISIS-relevant anger did not differ between the conservative condition 
and the control condition, or between the liberal condition or the control condition. 
Moreover, there were no significant interactions between political conservatism and 
condition contrasts in predicting fear or anger.  Greater anger was associated with greater 
support for military action against terrorism, but no other criteria. Greater fear was 
associated with more negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees and greater belief in an 
imminent terrorist attack, but no other criteria. Overall, therefore, the manipulated news 
exposure elicited fear, and fear and anger were differently associated with some attitudes. 
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Total and indirect effects can be seen in Table 6. There was a marginal total indirect 
effect of conservative (vs. control) condition in predicting terrorism imminence beliefs 
via fear and anger. However, neither unique effect of fear nor anger was significant. 
There was a marginal indirect effect of liberal (vs. control) condition on terrorism 
imminence beliefs via fear, although the total indirect effect was nonsignificant. Neither 
fear nor anger (nor their combined indirect effect) mediated the relations between 
condition contrasts and any other criteria.  
I then re-examined this model wherein the liberal-terrorism condition was coded as 
the reference group in the dummy-coding scheme. The analysis allows us to determine 
whether there were differences between the liberal- and conservative-terrorism conditions 
in attitudes (see Hardy, 1993), a contrast not tested with the coding system that sets the 
control condition as 0-coded.  Participants assigned to the conservative- (vs. liberal-) 
terrorism condition reported more negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees (B = .54, SE 
= .17, p = .002, β = .21) and greater terrorism imminence beliefs (B = .32, SE = .11, p = 
.003, β = .18), but not more support for military action against terrorism (B = .02, SE = 
.12, p =.888, β = .01), or more anti-Muslim attitudes (B = .17, SE = .11, p = .111, β = 
.11). Assignment to the conservative (vs. liberal) terrorism news condition did not 
differentially predict anger or fear (ps > .446), nor was the interaction between the 
conservative (vs. liberal) condition contrast and political conservatism significant in 
predicting either affect measure (ps > .312). Neither fear nor anger (nor their effect 
combined) mediated the relation between conservative (vs. liberal) condition contrast and 
any criteria (ps > .457). 
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RWA model.  Path coefficients for the RWA model can be seen in Table 5. 
Participants in the conservative-terrorism news (vs. control) condition reported more 
negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, and greater belief in an imminent terrorism 
attack, as expected. There was no difference in attitudes towards Muslims, or support for 
military action against terrorism, between the conservative condition and the control 
condition. None of the assessed attitudes differed between the liberal-terrorism news 
condition and the control condition.  
Participants assigned to the liberal or conservative condition reported feeling more 
fearful of (but not angrier toward) ISIS, relative to participants in the control condition. 
Neither the interaction between RWA and liberal (vs. control) condition contrast, nor the 
interaction between RWA and conservative (vs. control) condition contrast, was 
significant in predicting fear. There was a marginal interaction between RWA and the 
conservative (vs. control) condition contrast in predicting anger.7 Fear was positively 
associated with greater terrorism imminence beliefs, and marginally associated with 
negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees. Anger was positively associated with greater 
support for military action against terrorism, but not with any other criteria. Together 
these findings suggest that although both the liberal and conservative terrorism news (vs. 
control) elicited more fear regarding ISIS, only conservative-terrorism news elicited more 
negative attitudes and beliefs (negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees and terrorism 
imminence beliefs). Moreover, these findings suggest that fear and anger differentially 
predict attitudes in that fear is associated with anti-refugee attitudes and terrorism 
                                                          
7 I did not conduct simple slopes for this interaction given that this effect was marginally 
significant. 
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imminence beliefs, and anger is associated with support for military action against 
terrorism. 
 Total and indirect effects can be seen in Table 6. There were significant total 
indirect effects for the relations between the conservative (vs. control) condition contrast 
and support for military action and terrorism imminence beliefs via increased fear and 
anger, although there was only a specific or unique indirect effect of fear in predicting 
terrorism imminence beliefs. There was a marginal total indirect effect for the relation 
between liberal (vs. control) condition contrast and terrorism imminence beliefs, although 
neither unique effect of fear or anger was significant. Neither fear, nor anger, nor their 
combined effect, significantly mediated the relation between liberal news condition (vs. 
control) contrast and any other criteria. These findings suggest that differences in 
attitudes and beliefs elicited by conservative-terrorism news (vs. control) are largely not 
explained by differences in fear or anger regarding ISIS elicited by conservative-
terrorism news. 
 When the liberal condition was treated as the reference category (see above, last 
section), participants in the conservative (vs. liberal) condition reported more negative 
attitudes towards Syrian refugees (B = .59, SE = .16, p < .001 β = .23) and greater 
terrorism imminence beliefs (B = .33, SE = .11, p = .002, β = .19), but not more military 
support (B = .06, SE = .11, p = .607, β = .03) or more negative attitudes towards Muslims 
(B = .18, SE = .11, p = .091, β = .12). Participants in the conservative (vs. liberal) 
condition did not differ in fear or anger regarding terrorism (ps > .268), nor was the 
interaction between RWA and conservative (vs. liberal) condition significant in 
predicting either affect measure (ps > .147). Neither fear, nor anger, nor their combined 
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effect mediated the relation between conservative (vs. liberal) condition and any attitude 
measure (ps > .283). 
SDO model. Path coefficients for the SDO model can be seen in Table 5. 
Participants in the conservative (vs. control) condition reported more negative attitudes 
toward Syrian refugees, and more terrorism imminence beliefs (as expected), but not 
more negative attitudes towards Muslims or support for military action against terrorism. 
Participants in the liberal (vs. control) condition did not significantly differ in any of the 
assessed attitudes. In terms of emotional reactions, participants assigned to the 
conservative or liberal (vs. control) conditions expressed more fear regarding ISIS, but no 
more anger. SDO was not significantly associated with fear or anger, nor was the 
interaction between SDO and the conservative (vs. control) contrast, or the interaction 
between SDO and the liberal (vs. control) condition contrast, significant in predicting 
either affect measure. Fear was positively associated with terrorism imminence beliefs. 
Anger was positively associated with support for military action against terrorism (as 
expected), but no other attitudes.  
 Table 6 shows the total and indirect effects. There was a total indirect effect 
between conservative (vs. control) contrast and terrorism imminence beliefs via affect 
measures, with a significant unique indirect effect through greater fear. In addition, there 
was a marginal total indirect effect of conservative (vs. control) contrast in predicting 
military support via fear and anger combined, although no specific indirect effect was 
significant. Fear also marginally mediated the relation between liberal (vs. control) 
condition contrast and terrorism imminence beliefs (although the total indirect effect was 
non-significant). Thus there is little evidence that differences in attitudes elicited by 
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conservative-terrorism news (vs. control) are explained by differences in elicited fear or 
anger regarding ISIS. 
 Dummy codes were then re-computed to compare the liberal condition to the 
conservative condition (see above section). Participants in the conservative (vs. liberal) 
terrorism news condition reported significantly more negative attitudes toward Syrian 
refugees (B = .59, SE = .16, p < .001, β = .23), and greater terrorism imminence beliefs (B 
= .33, SE = .11, p = .002, β = .19), but not more military support (B = .06, SE = .11, p = 
.607, β = .03) or more anti-Muslim attitudes (B = .18, SE = .11, p = .091, β = .12). The 
conservative (vs. liberal) contrast, SDO, and their interaction were all non-significant in 
predicting fear or anger (ps > .08). The relations between the conservative (vs. liberal) 
condition and criteria were not mediated by fear, anger, or the combined effect of fear 
and anger (ps > .372). 
 Main analyses summary. Across all models, relative to both the liberal-terrorism 
news condition and the control condition, exposure to conservative-terrorism news 
fostered more negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees and greater belief in an 
imminent terrorist attack. In contrast, liberal-terrorism news (vs. control) did not elicit 
more negative group attitudes or beliefs in any model. Fear regarding ISIS mediated the 
relation between conservative-terrorism news (vs. control) and terrorism imminence 
beliefs in the RWA and SDO models. However, fear and anger did not consistently 
mediate any other relation between experimental condition contrasts and negative 
attitudes, suggesting that conservative-terrorism news largely does not foster more 
negative group attitudes or beliefs regarding terrorism imminence or military intervention 
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by fostering more negative affect regarding ISIS. Moreover, the effect that news exposure 
has on emotions largely does not depend on the individual’s political ideology. 
Exploratory Analyses 
Trust as a moderator between condition and affect. For exploratory purposes, I 
also tested whether the effect of condition on fear and anger regarding ISIS depends on 
the extent to which participants trusted the news that they were exposed to as valid and 
reliable. To accomplish this, I tested an additional model, in which I specified source trust 
as a moderator between experimental condition (control condition 0-coded) and affect 
measures (see Figure 8). Results can be seen in Table 7.   
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Figure 8. Conceptual exploratory moderated mediation model predicting belief in an 
imminent terrorist attack, anti-Muslim prejudice, prejudice toward Syrian refugees, and 
support for military action against terrorism (Study 2). Paths from media condition refer 
to the conservative-terrorism news condition relative to the liberal-terrorism news 
condition and the control condition, and the liberal-terrorism news condition relative to 
the control condition. Paths from condition to criteria represent paths with mediators 
included in the model (c-prime). Residuals were allowed to covary, but paths are not 
shown here for brevity. 
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Table 7 
Exploratory Moderated Mediation Model Assessing Interaction Between Source Trust 
and Condition in Predicting Criteria (Study 2) 
    B   SE β   
Fear (ISIS)       
DC1  0.40  0.25 0.11  
DC2  0.93 ** 0.27 0.24 ** 
source trust  0.07  0.15 0.06  
DC1Xtrust  0.34  0.20 0.13  
DC2Xtrust  0.29  0.20 0.15  
Anger (ISIS)       
DC1  -0.07  0.25 0.02  
DC2  0.50 * 0.24 0.15 * 
source trust  -0.05  0.12 -0.04  
DC1Xtrust  0.20  0.20 0.08  
DC2Xtrust   0.24   0.16 0.14   
Anti-Refugee Attitudes     
DC1  -0.25  0.16 -0.10  
DC2  0.34 * 0.16 0.13 * 
fear  0.08  0.05 0.13  
anger  0.04  0.05 0.05   
Anti- Muslim Attitudes       
DC1  -0.06  0.10 -0.04  
DC2  0.12  0.11 0.08  
fear  0.01  0.03 0.02  
anger  0.00  0.03 -0.01   
Military Support       
DC1  0.12  0.11 0.07  
DC2  0.17  0.11 0.10  
fear  0.05  0.03 0.11  
anger   0.13 *** 0.04 0.26 *** 
Terrorism Imminence Beliefs     
DC1  0.05  0.10 0.03  
DC2  0.39 ** 0.11 0.22 *** 
fear  0.14 *** 0.03 0.30 *** 
anger   0.04   0.03 0.08   
Note. Saturated moderated mediation model predicting negative attitudes towards Syrian 
refugees, anti-Muslim prejudice, support for military action against terrorism, and 
terrorism imminence beliefs via fear and anger regarding terrorism. DC1 compares 
liberal-terrorism news condition against the control condition. DC2 compares 
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conservative-terrorism news condition against the control condition. ‡ p < .07, * p < .05, 
** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 Paths between condition and attitudes and between affect measures and attitudes 
are largely the same as in the main model tests and for brevity will not be repeated in 
subsequent sections except where deviations are noteworthy. In this model, for instance, 
participants in the conservative (vs. control) condition reported more fear and anger 
regarding ISIS (see Table 7). Source trust was not associated significantly with ISIS-
relevant fear or anger, nor did any condition contrast interact with source trust in 
predicting anger or fear.  
Interactions between source trust and experimental condition in predicting 
attitudes. For exploratory purposes, I also assessed the interactions between 
experimental condition and source trust on criteria, without mediators in the model. First, 
I tested these interactions with the control condition coded as the reference category. 
Results can be seen in Table 8. Participants in the conservative (vs. control) condition 
reported more negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, more anti-Muslim attitudes, 
more support for military action against terrorism, and greater terrorism imminence 
beliefs. Participants in the liberal condition did not differ in attitudes from those in the 
control condition. Source trust was not associated with any criteria. There were 
significant interactions between source trust and conservative (vs. control) condition for 
all criteria. The significance of the slope of each attitude on source trust was then 
examined in each condition by re-coding the 0-coded condition. 
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Table 8 
Exploratory Model Assessing Interaction Between Condition and Source Trust in 
Predicting Criteria (Study 2) 
    B   SE   β   
Anti-Refugee Attitudes      
DC1  -0.21  0.16  -0.08  
DC2  0.74 *** 0.16  0.29 *** 
source trust  -0.04  0.09  -0.05  
DC1Xtrust  0.02  0.14  0.01  
DC2Xtrust   0.49 *** 0.11   0.39 *** 
Anti-Muslim Attitudes      
DC1  -0.09  0.10  -0.06  
DC2  0.28 * 0.11  0.18 * 
source trust  -0.06  0.05  -0.13  
DC1Xtrust  0.08  0.09  0.07  
DC2Xtrust   0.30 *** 0.07   0.39 *** 
Military Support      
DC1  0.11  0.12  0.06  
DC2  0.43 *** 0.11  0.25 *** 
source trust  0.01  0.06  0.03  
DC1Xtrust  0.17  0.09  0.14  
DC2Xtrust   0.21 ** 0.08   0.24 ** 
Terrorism Imminence Beliefs      
DC1  0.08  0.10  0.05  
DC2  0.62 *** 0.12  0.35 *** 
source trust  -0.05  0.05  -0.08  
DC1Xtrust  0.13  0.08  0.10  
DC2Xtrust   0.24 ** 0.07   0.28 ** 
Note. DC1 compares liberal-terrorism news condition against the control condition. DC2 
compares conservative-terrorism news condition against the control condition. * p < .05, 
** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 Attitudes toward Syrian refugees and Muslims. There was a significant 
interaction between condition contrasts and trust on negative attitudes towards Muslims 
and Syrian refugees. For attitudes towards Syrian refugees, the slopes of attitudes on trust 
were not significant in the control condition (see Table 8 which shows the effect of trust 
in the control [0-coded] condition) or in the liberal condition (B = -.02, SE = .11, p = 
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.829, β = -.03), but significantly positive in the conservative condition (B = .44, SE = .06, 
p < .001, β = .53; see Figure 9). A similar pattern was observed for anti-Muslim attitudes, 
with the slopes non-significant in the control (see Table 8) and the liberal condition (B = 
.02, SE = .07, p = .792, β = .04), but significantly positive in the conservative condition 
(B = .24, SE = .05, p < .001, β = .47; see Figure 10), suggesting that conservative (but not 
liberal) news on terrorism fostered more negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees and 
Muslims when participants trusted these news sources as valid and reliable.  
Moreover, for both attitudes, the slope in the conservative condition was 
significantly more positive than the slope in the liberal (anti-refugee attitudes: B = .47, SE 
= .12, p < .001, β = .37; anti-Muslim attitudes: B = .22, SE = .08, p = .008, β = .29) and 
control conditions (see DC2Xtrust; Table 8). The slopes in the liberal and control 
conditions did not differ from each other (see Table 8; DC1Xtrust). These results suggest 
that watching liberal news had a similar effect to watching no news on terrorism, 
regardless of how much participants trusted the source. However, results show 
increasingly negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees and Muslims in the conservative 
news condition as trust of these sources increases. 
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Figure 9. Moderated relation between experimental condition and negative attitudes 
toward Syrian refugees as a function of source trust (Study 2). Solid lines are significant 
slopes at p < .001. Dotted lines are nonsignificant (p > .05). 
 
 
Figure 10. Moderated relation between experimental condition and anti-Muslim attitudes 
as a function of source trust (Study 2). Solid lines are significant slopes at p < .001. 
Dotted lines are nonsignificant (p > .05). 
 
 Support for military action against terrorism. There was also a significant 
interaction between experimental contrasts and source trust in predicting support for 
military action against terrorism (Figure 11). Greater source trust was associated with 
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greater military support in the liberal (B = .18, SE = .07, p = .012, β = .32) and 
conservative terrorism news conditions (B = .22, SE = .05, p < .001, β = .39), but not in 
the control condition (see Table 8 which displays the effect of source trust in the control 
[0-coded] condition). The effect of source trust on military support was significantly 
more positive in the conservative condition, relative to the control condition (see Table 8; 
i.e., DC2Xtrust). The slope was not different in the liberal condition relative to the 
control condition (see Table 8; i.e., DC1Xtrust). The slope did not differ between the 
conservative condition and the liberal condition (B = .04, SE = .09, p = .626, β = .05). 
These results suggest that, after watching terrorism news from conservative sources, 
participants reported increasing more support for military action as news source trust 
increased. These results also suggest that, after watching liberal-terrorism news, 
participants’ military support increases as news source trust increases. However, the slope 
in the liberal condition did not differ from the control condition (itself a nonsignificant 
slope), so the result that liberal news increases military support when source trust is 
higher should be interpreted with caution. 
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Figure 11. Moderated relation between experimental condition and support for military 
action against terrorism as a function of source trust (Study 2). Solid lines are significant 
slopes at p < .05. Dotted lines are non-significant (p > .05). 
 
 Terrorism imminence beliefs. There was also a significant interaction between 
source trust and experimental contrasts in predicting terrorism imminence beliefs (Figure 
12). Greater source trust was associated with greater terrorism imminence beliefs in the 
conservative terrorism condition (B = .19, SE = .05, p < .001, β = .33), but not in the 
liberal (B = .08, SE = .07, p = .240, β = .13) or control conditions (see Table 8 which 
shows the effect of source trust in the control [0-coded] condition). The slope in the 
conservative condition was significantly stronger than the slope in the control condition 
(see Table 9; i.e., DC2Xtrust), but did not significantly differ from the slope in the liberal 
condition (B = .11, SE = .08, p = .166, β = .13). The slope in the liberal condition did not 
differ from the control condition (see Table 9; i.e., DC1Xtrust). These results suggest that 
the positive effect of conservative news on terrorism imminence beliefs was stronger 
when participants trusted these sources. However, the slope in the conservative condition 
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did not differ significantly from the liberal condition, which was in itself nonsignificant. 
Thus, this result should be interpreted with caution. 
  
Figure 12. Moderated relation between experimental condition and terrorism imminence 
beliefs as a function of source trust (Study 2). Solid lines are significant slopes at p < 
.001. Dotted lines are non-significant (p > .05). 
 
Right-wing adherence as a moderator between affect and attitudes. For 
exploratory purposes, I tested three additional models (one for each measure of right 
wing-adherence), in order to examine whether right-wing adherence moderates the 
relations between affect measures and criteria (see Figure 13). Experimental condition 
was dummy coded such that the control condition was treated as the reference category, 
and entered as the predictor of fear, anger, and each outcome measure (as per the model). 
Fear, anger, right-wing ideology, and the right-wing ideology x fear and right-wing 
ideology x anger interaction terms were entered as predictors of each criterion. Results 
can be seen in Table 9. 
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Figure 13. Conceptual exploratory moderated mediation model predicting belief in an 
imminent terrorist attack, anti-Muslim prejudice, negative attitudes toward Syrian 
refugees, and support for military action against terrorism (Study 2). Paths from media 
condition refer to the conservative-terrorism news condition relative to the liberal-
terrorism news condition and the control condition, and the liberal-terrorism news 
condition relative to the control condition. Paths from condition to criteria represent paths 
with mediators included in the model (c-prime).  Measures of right-wing adherence 
include political conservatism, RWA, and SDO (tested in separate models). Residuals 
were allowed to correlate, but paths are not shown here for brevity.
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Table 9 
Exploratory Moderated Mediation Model Assessing Interaction Between Ideology and Affect in Predicting Criteria (Study 2) 
        conservatism         RWA           SDO     
    B   SE β     B   SE β     B   SE β   
Fear (ISIS)                   
DC1  0.47 ‡ 0.26 0.13 ‡  0.49 * 0.24 0.13 *  0.49 * 0.24 0.13 * 
DC2  0.47  0.28 0.12   0.59 * 0.25 0.15 *  0.59 * 0.25 0.15 * 
Anger (ISIS)                   
DC1  0.13  0.23 0.04   0.12  0.23 0.04   0.12  0.23 0.04  
DC2   0.31   0.24 0.09     0.34   0.24 0.10     0.34   0.24 0.10   
Anti-Refugee Attitudes                
DC1  -0.25  0.16 -0.10   -0.25  0.15 -0.10   -0.14  0.15 -0.06  
DC2  0.34 * 0.16 0.13 *  0.31 ‡ 0.16 0.12 ‡  0.48 ** 0.15 0.19 ** 
fear  0.07  0.04 0.10   0.05  0.04 0.08   0.08 ‡ 0.04 0.11 ‡ 
anger  0.04  0.05 0.06   0.04  0.05 0.06   0.07  0.04 0.10  
ideology  0.28 *** 0.05 0.30 ***  0.42 *** 0.07 0.36 ***  0.57 *** 0.08 0.42 *** 
ideoXfear  -0.03  0.04 -0.06   -0.03  0.03 -0.05   -0.05  0.04 -0.08  
ideoXanger  0.02  0.04 0.03   0.07 ‡ 0.04 0.11 ‡  0.01  0.05 0.01  
Anti-Muslim Attitudes                               
DC1  -0.07  0.09 -0.05   -0.05  0.09 -0.03   0.04  0.08 0.03  
DC2  0.13  0.09 0.08   0.09  0.09 0.06   0.24 ** 0.09 0.16 ** 
fear  -0.02  0.03 -0.06   -0.02  0.02 -0.04   0.00  0.02 0.00  
anger  0.01  0.03 0.02   0.00  0.03 0.00   0.02  0.03 0.05  
ideology  0.23 *** 0.03 0.41 ***  0.35 *** 0.04 0.48 ***  0.46 *** 0.04 0.55 *** 
ideoXfear  -0.02  0.03 -0.05   -0.03  0.02 -0.07   -0.04 ‡ 0.02 -0.10 ‡ 
ideoXanger  0.01  0.03 0.03   0.05 * 0.02 0.12 *  0.02  0.03 0.04  
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Military Support                               
DC1  0.13  0.11 0.08   0.11  0.10 0.07   0.17  0.10 0.10  
DC2  0.17 . 0.10 0.10   0.14  0.10 0.08   0.24 * 0.10 0.14 * 
fear  0.03  0.03 0.07   0.03  0.03 0.07   0.04  0.03 0.10  
anger  0.14 *** 0.04 0.28 ***  0.13 *** 0.03 0.26 ***  0.15 *** 0.03 0.29 *** 
ideology  0.16 *** 0.04 0.25 ***  0.23 *** 0.05 0.30 ***  0.33 *** 0.05 0.36 *** 
ideoXfear  -0.02  0.03 -0.06   -0.02  0.03 -0.04   -0.03  0.03 -0.06  
ideoXanger  0.00  0.03 0.01   0.04  0.03 0.10   0.02  0.04 0.03  
Terrorism Imminence Beliefs                               
DC1  0.09  0.11 0.05   0.07  0.11 0.04   0.10  0.10 0.06  
DC2  0.42 *** 0.11 0.24 ***  0.38 *** 0.11 0.22 ***  0.44 *** 0.11 0.25 *** 
fear  0.14 *** 0.03 0.31 ***  0.13 *** 0.03 0.29 ***  0.14 *** 0.03 0.30 *** 
anger  0.04  0.03 0.07   0.04  0.03 0.07   0.04  0.03 0.08  
ideology  0.04  0.04 0.07   0.05  0.05 0.07   0.13 * 0.05 0.13 * 
ideoXfear  -0.02  0.02 -0.06   -0.06 * 0.02 -0.14 *  -0.05 * 0.03 -0.11 * 
ideoXanger   0.04  0.02 0.10    0.01   0.03 0.03     0.05   0.03 0.08   
Note. Saturated moderated mediation model predicting negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, anti-Muslim prejudice, support for 
military action against terrorism, and terrorism imminence beliefs via fear and anger regarding terrorism. DC1 compares liberal-
terrorism news condition against the control condition. DC2 compares conservative-terrorism news condition against the control 
condition. ideo = ideology, RWA = right-wing authoritarianism, SDO = social dominance orientation. Conservatism, RWA, and SDO 
models tested separately. ‡ p < .07, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Paths between condition contrasts and criteria, between condition contrasts and affect 
measures, and between affect measures and attitudes were largely the same in the main 
model tests (see Table 9). All three measures of right-wing adherence were associated 
with more negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees, greater anti-Muslim prejudice, and 
greater support for military action against terrorism. Greater SDO (but not conservatism 
or RWA) was also associated with greater terrorism imminence beliefs. Conservatism did 
not interact with fear or anger in predicting any attitude measure. In the RWA and SDO 
models, there were significant interactions between right-wing ideology and fear in 
predicting terrorism imminence beliefs. There were also marginal interactions between 
SDO and fear in predicting anti-Muslim attitudes. Further, RWA moderated the relation 
between anger and negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees (marginal), as well as the 
relation between anger and anti-Muslim attitudes. I did not conduct follow-up analyses on 
marginal interactions.  
Simple slope analyses were conducted to better understand the nature of the 
significant interaction between RWA and anger in predicting anti-Muslim attitudes. I 
tested the relation between anger and attitudes towards Muslims at high (1 SD above the 
mean), average, and low (1 SD below the mean) levels of RWA. Results of this analysis 
revealed that slopes were not significant at any level of RWA (ps > .10).8 As such, the 
interaction between RWA and anger in predicting anti-Muslim attitudes should be 
interpreted with caution.  
                                                          
8 Although all nonsignificant, the slope of anger on anti-Muslim attitudes was in the 
negative direction at low levels of RWA, and in the positive direction at average and high 
levels of RWA. 
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Given the significant interaction between RWA and fear in predicting terrorism 
imminence beliefs, simple slopes were conducted for terrorism imminence beliefs on fear 
at high, average, and low levels of RWA (see Figure 14). Results revealed that there was 
a positive association between fear and terrorism imminence at low (B = .19, SE = .04, p 
< .001, 95% BCa CI [.12, .25]), average (B = .13, SE = .03, p < .001, 95% BCa [.08, 
.17]), and high (B = .07, SE = .04, p = .042, 95% BCa CI [.02, .14]) levels of RWA. 
However, confidence intervals for each slope of terrorism imminence beliefs on fear 
overlapped with one another, suggesting that these slopes did not significantly differ.9  
Simple slopes were also conducted for terrorism imminence beliefs on fear at low, 
average, and high levels of SDO (see Figure 15). There was a significant positive effect 
of fear at low (B = .18, SE = .04, p < .001, 95% BCa [.12, .24]), average (B =.14, SE = 
.03, p < .001, 95% BCa [.09, .18]), and high (B = .09, SE = .03, p = .007, 95% BCa CI 
[.04, .15]) levels of SDO. But again, confidence intervals for these slopes overlapped, 
suggesting that the effect of fear on terrorism imminence beliefs did not differ at low, 
average, or high levels of SDO.10 
 
 
                                                          
9  Comparing confidence intervals in this manner is considered a conservative test of 
significance (Schenker & Gentleman, 2001), and this should be kept in mind when 
interpreting these results. 
10 Although the slopes did not significantly differ, the pattern of results was opposite to 
what was expected. That is, greater fear was (nonsignificantly) more strongly associated 
with greater terrorism imminence beliefs at lower (vs. higher) levels of RWA and SDO. 
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Figure 14. Moderated relation between fear and terrorism imminence beliefs as a 
function of RWA (right-wing authoritarianism) (Study 2). Solid lines are significant 
slopes at p < .05. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Moderated relation between fear and terrorism imminence beliefs as a 
function of SDO (social dominance orientation) (Study 2). Solid lines are significant 
slopes at p < .01. 
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 Together these findings suggest that right-wing adherence does not moderate the 
relation between fear or anger (regarding ISIS) and criteria. Whereas results revealed 
significant interactions between RWA and anger in predicting anti-Muslim attitudes, 
between RWA and fear in predicting terrorism imminence beliefs, and between SDO and 
fear in predicting terrorism imminence beliefs, follow-up analyses revealed that slopes at 
low, average, and high levels of right-wing adherence did not significantly differ, and 
thus these patterns should be interpreted with caution. 
Interactions between experimental condition and ideology in predicting 
attitudes. For exploratory purposes, I also examined interactions between ideology and 
experimental condition in predicting negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees, anti-
Muslim attitudes, military support, and terrorism imminence beliefs, without mediators in 
the model. To do so, I tested three additional models (one for each measure of right-wing 
adherence) in which the control condition was 0-coded. Results can be seen in Table 10. 
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Table 10  
Exploratory Model Assessing Interactions Between Condition and Ideology in Predicting Criteria (Study 2) 
      Conservatism         RWA           SDO     
    B   SE β     B   SE β     B   SE β   
Anti-Refugee Attitudes               
DC1  -0.18  0.16 -0.07   -0.23  0.15 -0.09   -0.09  0.14 -0.03  
DC2  0.40 ** 0.15 0.16 **  0.33 * 0.15 0.13 *  0.58 *** 0.15 0.23 *** 
ideology  0.31 *** 0.07 0.34 ***  0.50 *** 0.12 0.43 ***  0.60 *** 0.10 0.44 *** 
DC1Xideo  -0.14  0.11 -0.09   -0.22  0.19 -0.10   -0.10  0.18 -0.04  
DC2Xideo   0.07   0.12 0.04     -0.01   0.15 0.00     0.02   0.15 0.01   
Anti-Muslim Attitudes               
DC1  -0.08  0.09 -0.05   -0.07  0.09 -0.05   0.03  0.08 0.02  
DC2  0.13  0.10 0.08   0.07  0.09 0.04   0.26 ** 0.09 0.17 ** 
ideology  0.21 *** 0.05 0.38 ***  0.34 *** 0.08 0.48 ***  0.44 *** 0.06 0.53 *** 
DC1Xideo  -0.02  0.07 -0.02   -0.06  0.10 -0.05   0.00  0.09 0.00  
DC2Xideo   0.06   0.08 0.06     0.05   0.10 0.04     0.09   0.09 0.06   
Military Support               
DC1  0.19  0.11 0.11   0.15  0.11 0.09   0.23 * 0.11 0.13 * 
DC2  0.25 * 0.11 0.14 *  0.22 * 0.11 0.13 *  0.35 ** 0.11 0.20 ** 
ideology  0.28 *** 0.07 0.44 ***  0.30 *** 0.10 0.37 **  0.33 *** 0.09 0.36 *** 
DC1Xideo  -0.16 ‡ 0.08 -0.15 ‡  -0.01  0.13 0.00   -0.03  0.14 -0.02  
DC2Xideo   -0.17 ‡ 0.10 -0.16 ‡   0.13   0.13 -0.10     -0.02   0.12 -0.01   
Terrorism Imminence Beliefs               
DC1  0.15  0.11 0.09   0.12  0.10 0.07   0.15  0.11 0.09  
DC2  0.49 *** 0.11 0.28 ***  0.46 *** 0.11 0.26 ***  0.52 *** 0.12 0.30 *** 
ideology  0.10  0.07 0.16   0.14  0.09 0.18   0.11  0.09 0.12  
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DC1Xideo  -0.09  0.09 -0.09   -0.20  0.11 -0.14   0.05  0.12 0.03  
DC2Xideo   0.03   0.09 0.02     0.05   0.11 0.04     0.05   0.13 0.03   
Note. DC1 compares liberal-terrorism news condition against the control condition. DC2 compares conservative-terrorism news 
condition against the control condition. Ideo = ideology (conservatism, RWA or SDO), RWA = right-wing authoritarianism, SDO = 
social dominance orientation. Conservatism, RWA, and SDO models tested separately. ‡ p < .07, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Relations between condition contrasts and criteria look largely the same as in the 
main model tests (see Table 10). In all models, each measure of right-wing adherence 
was positively associated with anti-refugee attitudes, anti-Muslim attitudes, and support 
for military action against terrorism. There was a marginally significant interaction 
between conservatism and the conservative (vs. control) contrast, as well as between 
conservative and the liberal (vs. control) contrast in predicting support for military action. 
Thus, there is little evidence to suggest that the effect of news exposure on attitudes and 
beliefs surrounding terrorism depends on degree of right-wing adherence. 
Study 2 Discussion 
 The purpose of Study 2 was to investigate the causal effects of liberal and 
conservative news on attitudes towards Syrian refugees, anti-Muslim attitudes, terrorism 
imminence beliefs, and support for military action against terrorism. Study 2 also sought 
to investigate potential mechanisms by which different news sources may elicit different 
attitudes by examining emotional reactions to ISIS (fear and anger) as potential 
mediators. I also sought to investigate whether right-wing ideologies strengthened the 
effect of different news exposure on negative emotions. For exploratory purposes, I 
examined whether right-wing ideologies moderated the relations between affect and 
outcome measures, or relations between news exposure and outcomes. Also for 
exploratory purposes, I examined whether source trust moderated relations between news 
exposure and negative emotions or relations between news exposure and group attitudes 
and beliefs regarding terrorism imminence and military intervention. 
 First I hypothesized that liberal terrorism news would elicit more negative 
attitudes towards Syrian refugees, more anti-Muslim attitudes, greater terrorism 
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imminence beliefs, and greater support for military action against terrorism, relative to 
the control condition (H1a). It is important to keep in mind that, despite being liberal in 
source type, the news content nonetheless covers terrorism. This hypothesis was not 
supported. Terrorism news from liberal sources did not foster more negative group 
attitudes, terrorism imminence beliefs, or military support, relative to the control 
condition in any of the hypothesized models. In this sense, therefore, presenting 
terrorism-relevant news from a liberal news source may fail to exacerbate negative 
intergroup views, terrorism imminence beliefs, and military support.  
I also hypothesized that conservative terrorism news should elicit more negative 
attitudes relative to both the liberal and control conditions (H1b). This hypothesis was 
largely supported. In all three models, participants who watched terrorism news from 
conservative (vs. control and vs. liberal) sources expressed more negative attitudes 
towards Syrian refugees and greater terrorism imminence beliefs. Together these findings 
suggest that experimental manipulations of conservative-terrorism news can elicit 
negative outgroup attitudes and beliefs, whereas liberal-terrorism news largely does not, 
at least with regard to attitudes and beliefs surrounding Islamist terrorism. 
I also hypothesized that terrorism news from liberal sources should elicit more 
anger and fear regarding terrorism than control videos (i.e., sports news clips), and that 
the conservative terrorism news condition would elicit more fear and anger relative to 
both other conditions (H2). I also hypothesized that fear and anger would be positively 
associated with negative group attitudes (H3), and that fear and anger would mediate the 
relation between experimental contrasts and criteria (H4). Overall, Hypotheses 2-4 
received partial support. Across models, the liberal-terrorism condition and conservative-
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terrorism condition elicited more fear (but not anger) regarding ISIS relative to the 
control condition. Of interest, greater fear was consistently associated with greater belief 
in an imminent terrorist attack, but not associated with any other outcome measure (in all 
models). Greater anger was consistently associated with greater support for military 
action against terrorism in all models, but no other criteria. Together these findings 
suggest that differential news exposure affects fear regarding terrorist groups (e.g., ISIS), 
and that fear and anger are associated with different attitudes regarding issues centered 
around Islamist terrorism.  
In the SDO and RWA models, there was a significant indirect effect of fear 
regarding ISIS in the relation between conservative (vs. control) news condition and 
terrorism imminence beliefs. However, no other indirect effect of right-wing adherence 
on any attitude via fear or anger was significant. These findings suggest that exposure to 
conservative news sources impacts group attitudes and beliefs surrounding Islamist 
terrorism, but not through fostering negative emotions, such as fear or anger. 
Finally, I hypothesized that right-wing ideologies (conservatism, RWA, SDO) 
might moderate the relation between news exposure and negative emotions regarding 
terrorism (fear, anger; H5). I anticipated that this relation could show an effect of 
conservative sensitivity in that greater right-wing ideology would be associated with more 
fear and anger in the liberal (vs. control) condition, and more fear and anger in the 
conservative (vs. liberal and control) condition. In contrast, those lower in right-wing 
adherence would show lower fear and anger in all conditions. I also anticipated that this 
relation could show an effect of the reactive-liberals hypothesis, whereby lower right-
wing adherence would be associated with more fear and anger in the liberal (vs. control) 
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condition, and more fear and anger in the conservative (vs. liberal and control) condition. 
In contrast, those higher in right-wing adherence would show relatively high fear and 
anger regarding terrorism regardless of condition. However, there were no significant 
interactions between condition and right-wing adherence in predicting fear or anger. As 
such, I did not find evidence for conservative sensitivity or the reactive-liberals 
hypothesis.  
I also tested several additional models for exploratory purposes. For instance, I 
tested whether right-wing adherence moderates the relation between negative affect (fear 
or anger) and criteria. Greater RWA strengthened the relation between anger and attitudes 
towards Muslims. However, follow-up analyses revealed that despite a significant 
interaction, the effect of anger in predicting anti-Muslim attitudes was nonsignificant at 
high, average, and low levels of RWA. There were also significant interactions between 
fear and RWA, as well as between fear and SDO, in predicting terrorism imminence 
beliefs. However, follow up analyses revealed that, in both cases, the slope of fear on 
terrorism imminence beliefs did not significantly differ at low, average, or high, levels of 
right-wing ideology. Thus, there is little evidence that the effect of fear or anger 
regarding ISIS on group attitudes, military support, or terrorism imminence beliefs 
depends on a person’s right-wing ideology. 
In addition, I explored whether news source trust moderates the relation between 
experimental condition and negative emotions. Results of these tests were all 
nonsignificant, suggesting that the effect of experimental condition on fear and anger 
regarding ISIS did not depend on the extent to which participants trusted the information 
presented in the videos to be valid and reliable.  
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I also tested whether right-wing adherence moderated the relation between 
experimental condition and criteria, without the mediators (fear and anger) in the model. 
Results revealed that none of the right-wing ideologies (conservatism, RWA, SDO) 
moderated the relations between liberal or conservative news exposure (vs. control 
condition) and any outcome measure. Overall there is little evidence that the effect of 
terrorism news, either from liberal or conservative sources, on anti-Muslim attitudes, 
attitudes toward Syrian refugees, terrorism imminence beliefs, and military support, 
depends on political ideology. 
Finally, I tested whether source trust moderated the relations between news 
exposure and criteria (group attitudes, terrorism imminence beliefs, and military support). 
The liberal and control conditions exerted a similar effect on attitudes towards Syrian 
refugees and Muslims across all levels of source trust. However, source trust was 
associated with increases in negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees and anti-Muslim 
attitudes in the conservative condition. These findings suggest that conservative news 
exposure has a particularly negative affect on attitudes towards Muslims and Syrian 
refugees when the viewer trusts these sources to be reliable and valid.  
Similar results were seen for the interaction between source trust and news 
exposure in predicting terrorism imminence beliefs. In this interaction, liberal news 
exposure and control clips affected terrorism imminence beliefs across all levels of trust 
similarly. However, the effect of conservative news exposure on terrorism imminence 
beliefs was stronger when participants trusted the source to be valid and reliable.  
Whereas the effect of source trust in the conservative condition differed significantly 
from the effect of trust in the control condition, it was not different from the effect of 
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trust in the liberal condition (which in itself showed a non-significant effect of trust). 
Nonetheless, this finding suggests that the effect of conservative-terrorism news (vs. 
control) on terrorism imminence beliefs is particularly strong when the viewer trusts the 
sources to be valid and reliable. 
There was also a significant interaction between experimental condition and trust 
in predicting support for military action against terrorism. Both slopes of trust in the 
conservative and liberal conditions were significantly positive. The slope in the 
conservative condition was significantly stronger in the positive direction than the slope 
in the control condition, but the slope in the liberal condition did not differ from the 
control. Moreover, the slopes in the liberal and conservative conditions did not differ. 
These findings suggest that both liberal-terrorism and conservative-terrorism news elicits 
greater support for military action when trust of these sources is higher. However, only 
the slope in the conservative-terrorism condition, and not the slope in the liberal 
condition, differed from the control condition.  
    General Discussion 
In two studies I examined the relation between right-wing adherence, news 
exposure, and attitudes towards Syrian refugees and Muslims, and beliefs about terrorism 
imminence and military intervention. Study 1a employed experts to rate the degree of 
conservative or liberal leaning in multiple news sources, relevant for shaping the methods 
of Studies 1b and 2. In Study 1b, greater right-wing adherence (conservatism, RWA, and 
SDO) was associated with more anti-Muslim prejudice, anti-refugee prejudice, and 
greater belief in an imminent terrorist attack. Even when controlling for experimental 
condition contrasts, in Study 2, all three measures of right-wing adherence were 
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positively associated (significantly or marginally) with anti-Muslim attitudes, anti-
refugee attitudes, and greater military support in the liberal news condition and in the 
control condition. Two of the three right-wing ideologies were also significantly or 
marginally associated with terrorism imminence beliefs in the conservative news 
condition. Thus, these findings are consistent with past work, highlighting the role of 
individual differences, and in particular, political ideology, in predicting group attitudes, 
in this case, attitudes regarding terrorism and refugees.  
 Study 1b showed that greater right-wing adherence was associated with less use 
and trust of liberal news sources, and greater trust of conservative news sources. In turn, 
greater use of conservative sources was positively associated with negative attitudes 
towards Muslims, whereas greater use of liberal news sources was negatively associated 
with anti-Muslim attitudes, anti-refugee attitudes, and greater liberal news trust was 
negatively associated with terrorism imminence beliefs. These findings are consistent 
with past research showing that liberal and conservative news exposure is associated with 
different attitudes. For instance, past correlational work shows that among Americans, 
greater preference for conservative (vs. liberal) news sources is associated with greater 
climate change denial and more negative attitudes towards Mexican immigrants (de 
Zuniga et al., 2012; Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016; Li et al., 2016).  
Moreover, Study 1b extends this past work by examining the role of source trust 
in predicting attitudes, and by showing that trust in different sources is associated with 
different attitudes regarding Muslim, Syrian refugees, and terrorism. Study 1b also 
showed that differences between left- and right-wing adherents in attitudes regarding 
Muslims, Syrian refugees, and terrorism were partially explained by use and trust of 
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different news sources. In the conservatism and SDO models, there were total (i.e., non-
specific) indirect effects of right-wing adherence on group attitudes and terrorism 
imminence beliefs via the media variables. There was also a total indirect effect of RWA 
on attitudes toward Syrian refugees via news measures. Study 1b also demonstrated that, 
across models, there were particularly strong indirect effects between right-wing 
adherence and attitudes via liberal news use. For instance, liberal news use explained 
approximately 20% of the relation between right-wing adherence and anti-Muslim 
attitudes, and 13-26% of the relation between right-wing adherence and anti-refugee 
attitudes. As such, Study 1b extends correlational work on news exposure on group 
attitudes, by suggesting the importance of liberal news use in not exacerbating negative 
group attitudes and beliefs surrounding Islamist terrorism.  
 Study 2 extends findings from Study 1b and past research by employing an 
experimental design to manipulate news exposure. Results from Study 2 suggest that 
conservative news on terrorism increases terrorism imminence beliefs and negative 
attitudes towards Syrian refugees relative to exposure to liberal-terrorism news and to 
news irrelevant to terrorism (i.e., sports). My results suggest that liberal news, even on 
ISIS-driven terrorism, does not foster more negative attitudes or beliefs regarding 
Islamist terrorism, as there were no differences between the liberal-terrorism news 
condition and the control condition on any outcome measure. Past research suggests that, 
among Americans, conservative news media fosters misinformation regarding political 
issues (Mirkinson, 2010; Pew Research Center, 2007) and influences voting behaviour 
(e.g., DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007). Study 2 extends these findings by suggesting that 
conservative news media also affects attitudes towards social groups and beliefs about 
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terrorism and use of the military, whereas liberal news media, even when covering 
terrorism topics, does not. Moreover, Study 2 employs a unique and critical experimental 
paradigm to directly test a causal path.  
 With regard to attitudes surrounding Islam, past research in Western countries 
shows that greater news exposure generally is associated with more anti-Muslim 
attitudes, and endorsement of fewer rights for Muslims (Ogan et al., 2014). My research 
extends these findings to suggest that different types of news exposure can differentially 
shape terrorism-relevant attitudes and beliefs. In Study 1b, conservative news use was 
associated with more negative attitudes and beliefs, whereas liberal news use and trust 
was negatively associated with these variables. Results of Study 2 suggest that 
conservative news sources drive negative attitudes and beliefs about terrorism 
imminence, whereas liberal news exposure does not.  As such, my studies suggest that 
not all news media, even on terrorism topics, foster negative attitudes towards 
marginalized groups mentally associated with terrorism in the wider culture. As such, 
news media as a collective need not necessarily be avoided entirely to reduce prejudice. 
This finding is encouraging in light of findings that, among Germans, news exposure can 
have benefits, including boosting political knowledge and fostering discussion of political 
issues with peers (Trepte & Schmitt, 2017).  
Further, these findings suggest that conservative news on terrorism can shape 
attitudes after only six or seven minutes of exposure. No previous study has tested this 
potential. Of note, I cannot rule out the possibility that terrorism news from liberal 
sources may negatively affect attitudes after longer periods of viewing. As such, future 
research may explore the effects of different news sources after longer exposure, or after 
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repeated exposure over time. Moreover, Study 2 examined participants’ attitudes after a 
relatively short period of time following the news manipulation. Future research may 
assess attitudes after longer periods of time (e.g., hours, days, years) following news 
exposure, to explore the duration of the effect of news consumption on group attitudes 
and beliefs. 
Results of Study 2 suggest that individual differences in right-wing ideology are 
associated with attitudes towards Muslims, attitudes towards Syrian refugees, and 
military support, above the effect of news exposure in situ. That is, what people bring 
with them to the lab is a meaningful predictor of intergroup outcomes, even above strong 
contextual manipulations (e.g., discussions of terrorism), consistent with contemporary 
theorizing (Hodson, 2009; Hodson, Costello, & MacInnis, 2013; Hodson & Dhont, 2015; 
Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).  At the same time, when controlling for right-wing ideology, 
conservative news about terrorism was important in shaping attitudes and beliefs 
surrounding Islam and terrorism. Moreover, the effects seen in Study 2 may be even 
stronger in the general population, given that there may be more variability between 
people in outgroup attitudes and higher levels of right-wing adherence in community 
samples with more equal numbers of men and women than in student samples that 
contain disproportionately more young women (Henry, 2008).  
Thus, both the person and the situation are critical in understanding intergroup 
attitudes (Hodson, 2009; Hodson, Costello, & MacInnis, 2013; Hodson & Dhont, 2015), 
here in the context of media exposure. Coupled with findings from Study 1b, my results 
suggest that right-wing attitudes are not only associated with both outgroup attitudes and 
news media habits, but also that exposure to different news sources can differentially 
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affect attitudes and beliefs. Moreover, my results show both right-wing adherence and 
news exposure are associated with attitudes and beliefs surrounding terrorism, but that the 
effect of right-wing (vs. left-wing, sports) news exposure on attitudes does not depend on, 
or interact with, degree of right-wing adherence. Future research may explore whether 
other individual difference variables (e.g., personality) interact with media exposure in 
shaping group attitudes. Future research may also explore the reciprocal effect of pre-
existing attitudes on choice in news media, and how news exposure may strengthen prior 
attitudes over time. Moreover, future research may manipulate attitudes regarding Islam 
to assess whether these attitudes have a casual impact on news media choice. 
 Study 2 also sought to examine the psychological mechanism by which different 
news sources affect group attitudes and beliefs regarding terrorism imminence and the 
need for military action. Valkenburg and Peter (2013) suggest that media elicits different 
attitudes by eliciting (among other mechanisms) different emotions. Moreover, past 
research suggests that conservative (vs. liberal) sources in the United States tend to 
contain more name-calling, exaggeration, and negative framing of social issues such as 
immigration (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011; Woods & Arthur, 2014). Results from Study 2 
suggest that such negative tone in conservative news may elicit more fear regarding ISIS, 
but that this negative affect largely does not explain why conservative news elicits more 
negative attitudes and beliefs surrounding terrorism. Future research may explore whether 
news media elicits different negative emotions, such as sadness or disgust, as past 
research conducted across several western countries suggest that these emotions may also 
be related to more negative outgroup attitudes (Choma, Hodson, & Costello, 2012; 
Hodson et al., 2013; Kossowska, Bukowski, & Van Hiel, 2008).  
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Further, it is possible that news exposure differentially shapes attitudes by 
affecting cognitive appraisals of social groups. This suggestion is consistent with 
Intergroup Emotions theory, which argues that cognitive appraisals of a situation are an 
essential ingredient in shaping outgroup attitudes (Smith & Mackie, 2000). That is, 
whether an individual interprets an intergroup situation as promoting or harming his/her 
goals is fundamental to that individual’s development of group attitudes. For example, 
although liberal and conservative sources may cover the same general topics (e.g., 
immigration, terrorism), news sources may highlight different aspects of these topics in 
ways that influence cognitive appraisals of various social groups. These cognitive 
appraisals may, in turn, elicit different group attitudes. As such, future research may 
explore how liberal and conservative sources differentially foster cognitive appraisals, or 
stereotypes, of outgroup members.  
 Although Study 2 only provides weak evidence that news sources differentially 
affect negative emotion regarding terrorism, fear and anger were positively associated 
with several criteria. Bivariate correlations revealed that both fear and anger were 
positively associated with negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees, military support, and 
terrorism imminence beliefs. However, after controlling for the effect of news exposure 
and isolating the effect of each emotion, greater fear was only consistently associated 
with greater belief in an imminent terrorist attack, and greater anger was only associated 
with greater support for military action against terrorism. These findings are consistent 
Intergroup Emotions Theory, which posits that greater anger is associated with greater 
desire to attack or confront the target group (Smith & Mackie, 2000), and past work 
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showing that greater fear regarding terrorist attacks is associated with greater expectation 
of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack oneself (Skitka et al., 2004).  
 The current study focused on political ideology and news sources habits in a 
Canadian context. As evident in past research and in Studies 1a and 1b, manifestations of 
political ideology and perceptions of news media differs across countries (Political 
Compass, 2016a; Political Compass, 2016b). For instance, Studies 1a and 1b suggests 
that conservatives in Canada are similar to Americans who fall in the middle of the 
political spectrum with regard to their news source habits (Political Compass, 2016a; 
Political Compass, 2016b). As such, future research may explore ideology, news source 
habits, and group attitudes in different cultures. Moreover, past research has 
differentiated between anti-Islam sentiment and anti-Muslim attitudes, suggesting that 
attitudes regarding the Islamist religion are not conceptually identical to attitudes towards 
Muslim people (Imhoff & Recker, 2012; Uenal, 2016). Future research may explore this 
nuance in relation to ideology and news media preferences. 
Results of Study 2 also show that the effect of conservative news was particularly 
strong when participants reported trusting these sources. In particular, those exposed to 
conservative news showed particularly negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees and 
Muslims, as well as greater support for military action and greater terrorism imminence 
beliefs, to the extent that they more strongly trusted the sources. These findings provide 
insight into prejudice reduction surrounding Islam and terrorism. Note that past research 
and the current studies suggest that greater right-wing adherence is associated with more 
negative towards outgroups (e.g., Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Crowson, 2009; Davidov & 
Meuleman, 2012; Ogan et al., 2014; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Whereas there may be large 
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differences in political ideology across time periods, generations, and cultures, right-wing 
adherence may have a genetic component and be hard to change at the level of the 
individual (see Hodson & Dhont, 2015). As such, efforts to reduce prejudice by reducing 
an individual’s level of right-wing adherence may be difficult. However, my findings 
suggest that, independent of ideology, altering one’s news media consumption may 
reduce negative attitudes and beliefs surrounding terrorism. Given that liberal news often 
did not foster more negative attitudes regarding Islam and terrorism relative to control 
videos, individuals may consider using a variety of news outlets, with particular focus on 
increasing the number of liberal sources (e.g., Washington Post, Huffington Post) from 
which they obtain information. Given past research suggesting that consumers of 
conservative news outlets are less informed about current issues (Mirkinson, 2010; Pew 
Research Center, 2007), decreasing reliance on conservative sources may not only 
decrease negative attitudes and beliefs regarding Muslims and terrorism, but may also 
increase political knowledge.  
Moreover, given that conservative news is more likely to elicit negative attitudes 
when participants trust these sources, efforts can be made to undermine trust in right-
leaning news media. For instance, organizations such as PolitiFact investigate and expose 
fake claims made by politicians and news outlets (Adair & Holan, 2013). These efforts 
may be crucial in fostering skepticism in conservative sources, which often exaggerate 
political and social issues (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). Undermining trust in these news 
outlets may lessen the impact of conservative news on fostering negative attitudes 
towards Syrian refugees and anti-Muslim attitudes, lessen terrorism imminence beliefs, 
and reduce support for military action in the Middle East.  
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Concluding Remarks 
In sum, the current studies suggest that both right-wing ideology and conservative 
news exposure (both correlational and experimental) play important roles in fostering 
negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, anti-Muslim attitudes, and beliefs surrounding 
terrorism. The effect of conservative news on these attitudes is particularly strong when 
individuals trust these sources as valid and reliable. As such, undermining trust in news 
media can be a powerful tool in shaping public opinion. These findings have particularly 
strong implications in the current political climate, with the majority of Americans 
perceiving news outlets as favouring one political party over another (Gallup, 2017), with 
politicians recently labelling traditionally well-respected news sources (e.g., New York 
Times, NBC News) as “fake news,” and with suggestions that the media is the enemy of 
the American people (Ghitis, 2017). Largely, these criticisms have focused on liberal 
sources, which may be less likely to foster negative attitudes towards refugees and beliefs 
surrounding terrorism, Muslims, and Syrian refugees, relative to conservative sources. 
Re-directing these efforts, by encouraging use of liberal news sources, and undermining 
trust in conservative sources, are promising avenues if one seeks to reduce negative 
attitudes towards Muslims and Syrian refugees. Given that migration represents one of 
the most pressing concerns of the 21st century (Hodson & Hewstone, 2013), fostering 
positive intergroup relations by shaping news media consumption, and working to resolve 
migration crises (such as the Syrian refugee crisis) may be critical in fostering global 
stability.  
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Appendix A 
News Source Measure 
Some people argue that news media have a particular slant or bias. In addition to “the facts”, 
liberal news sources may also promote ideas and policies regarding liberty and equality. In 
addition to “the facts”, conservative news sources may also promote tradition, emphasize 
danger/threats, and oppose policies that may change society too much. Please indicate the extent 
to which you believe the following news sources have a liberal or conservative leaning. We are 
simply interested in your perception.  
CNN (Cable News Network) 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                             conservative 
NBC News (National Broadcasting Company) 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
CBS News (Columbia Broadcasting Company) 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                             conservative 
Fox News  
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                                             Very 
Know       liberal                                           conservative 
MSNBC 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                            conservative 
PBS (Public Broadcasting System) 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                             conservative 
New York Times 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                         conservative 
USA Today 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                                         Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
Wall Street Journal 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                                         Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
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Washington Post 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                                       conservative 
Google News 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
Yahoo News 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                                      conservative 
Huffington Post 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                                         Very 
Know       liberal                                              conservative 
Huffington Post Canada 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                             conservative 
The Daily Show (with John Stewart/Trevor Noah) 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
Al Jazeera (or Al Jazeera America) 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
The Guardian 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
Buzzfeed 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
CTV News 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                             conservative 
Global News 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
The Globe and Mail 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
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CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
National Post 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                                         Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
Toronto Star 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
Sun News Network (e.g. Toronto Sun, Vancouver Sun etc.) 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
Maclean’s Magazine 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                                         Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
Forbes Magazine 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
Real Time with Bill Maher 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
ABC News 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
NPR (National Public Radio) 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
 New Yorker Magazine 
0                    1                   2                     3                     4                      5                    6                   7 
Don’t        Very                           Very 
Know       liberal                                          conservative 
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Appendix B 
Study 1a Demographics 
Please indicate whether you are a student or faculty member? (tick one) 
 
Undergraduate Student 
Graduate Student 
Faculty 
Other: _____ 
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Appendix C 
3-Item Conservatism Scale 
1. Please indicate on the scale below how liberal or conservative (in terms of your 
general outlook) you are in general: 
 1  2  3  4  5  6            7                     
Very liberal                                                                                         Very conservative     
2. How liberal or conservative do you tend to be when it comes to social policy 
1  2  3  4  5  6            7                     
Very liberal                                                                                         Very conservative     
3. How liberal or conservative do you tend to be when it comes to economic policy?  
1  2  3  4  5  6            7                     
Very liberal                                                                                         Very conservative     
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Appendix D 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
Please indicate your response, using the scale below.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7                               
Prefer 
not to 
say 
Strongly  
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Slightly  
Disagree 
Neither 
Disagree 
Nor 
Agree 
Slightly  
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly    
Agree 
      
 
1.  Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6  7                   
2.  Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt 
every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today who are trying to ruin it 
for their godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4.  Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating 
away at our moral fibre and traditional beliefs.   
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.   The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be 
justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6.   Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, 
even if it makes them different from everyone else.   
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7.   People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other old traditional forms of 
religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral 
and immoral. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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8.   The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our 
traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers 
spreading bad ideas.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
9.   There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. What our country really needs, instead of more “civil rights” is a stiff dose of law and 
order. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our 
government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way” things are supposed to 
be done.   
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show that 
we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and trouble-makers if we are going to 
save our moral standards and preserve law and order.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix E 
Social Dominance Orientation- 7 Scale (Short-Form) 
Show how much you favour or oppose each idea below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 
on the scale below. You can work quickly; your first feeling is generally best. 
1    2   3   4   5           6                    7 
Strongly     Somewhat Slightly   Neutral  Slightly           Somewhat       Strongly 
Oppose   Oppose     Oppose    Favour          Favour   Favour 
 
1. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom. 
1    2   3   4   5   6          7 
2. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
1    2   3   4   5   6          7 
3.  Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top. 
1    2   3   4   5   6          7 
4. No one group should dominate in society. 
1    2   3   4   5   6          7 
5. It is unjust to try to make groups equal. 
1    2   3   4   5   6          7 
6. Group equality should not be our primary goal. 
1    2   3   4   5   6          7 
7. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed. 
1    2   3   4   5   6          7 
8. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 
1    2   3   4   5   6          7 
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Appendix F 
Media Use and Trust 
[NOTE: Participants will only be shown the trust question IF they score 1 or higher 
on the usage question] 
Please indicate how much you watch/use each news source. Of the sources you’ve heard 
of, indicate how much you generally TRUST it for news about government and politics. 
CNN (Cable News Network) 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
ABC News (American Broadcasting Company) 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
NBC News (National Broadcasting Company) 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
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CBS News (Columbia Broadcasting System) 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0  1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Fox News 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
MSNBC 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
PBS (Public Broadcasting Service) 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHAPING RESPONSES 128  
BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0  1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Reuters 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
New York Times 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
USA TODAY 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
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Wall Street Journal 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
NPR (National Public Radio) 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Washington Post 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Google News 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Yahoo News 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
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Huffington Post 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Huffington Post Canada 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Daily Show (with John Stewart/Trevor Noah) 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
New Yorker Magazine 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
The Economist Magazine 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
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Sean Hannity Show 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Rush Limbaugh Show 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Bloomberg 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Glenn Beck Program 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Al Jazeera (or Al Jazeera America) 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
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Drudge Report 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
The Guardian 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0  1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Politico 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
The Blaze 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
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Breitbart 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Slate 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Buzzfeed 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
CTV News 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
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Financial Post 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Global News 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
The Globe and Mail 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
National Post 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
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CHCH 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Toronto Star 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Sun News Network (e.g. Toronto Sun, Vancouver Sun etc.) 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Canada Free Press 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Maclean’s Magazine 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
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Ottawa Citizen 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Forbes Magazine 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Real Time with Bill Maher 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Thom Hartmann Show 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Tonight Here and Abroad 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
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How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Clock In Canada 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
MegaTom Tonight 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
Other (please specify): 
How often do you use this source? 
0   1  2  3  4  5 
Haven’t Heard Of                 Never Use             Hardly Ever Use        Sometimes Use            Often Use             Very Often Use 
How much do you trust this source? 
0   1                    2                          3                       4                      5                       6                         7 
Don’t Know    Completely Distrust     Often Distrust      Slightly Distrust      Neutral    Slightly Trust     Often Trust   Completely Trust 
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Appendix G 
Modern Racism Scale 
Please indicate your responses to the following questions. 
 
• Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more respect 
for Muslims than they deserve. 
 
                1           2        3                   4                         5 
Strongly Disagree                  Strongly Agree 
• It is easy to understand the anger of Muslims in Canada. 
 
1          2        3                   4                         5 
Strongly Disagree                  Strongly Agree 
• Discrimination against Muslims is no longer a problem in Canada.    
 
                1           2        3                   4                         5 
Strongly Disagree                  Strongly Agree 
• Over the past few years, Muslims have gotten more economically than they deserve. 
  
                1           2        3                   4                         5 
Strongly Disagree                  Strongly Agree 
 
• Muslims have more influence on government policies than they ought to have. 
 
                1           2        3                   4                         5 
Strongly Disagree                  Strongly Agree 
• Muslims are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.   
  
 
                1           2        3                   4                         5 
Strongly Disagree                  Strongly Agree 
• Muslims should not push themselves where they are not wanted.   
 
                1           2        3                   4                         5 
Strongly Disagree                  Strongly Agree 
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Appendix H 
Attitudes Toward Syrian Refugees 
• Allowing greater numbers of Syrian refugees in the country will pose a threat 
to Canada’s national security. 
 1                                     2                               3                            4   5 
Strongly Disagree         Slightly Disagree            Neutral           Slightly Agree        Strongly Agree 
 
•  Allowing greater numbers of Syrian refugees into Canada will NOT make 
our country more dangerous. 
  1                                     2                               3                            4  5 
Strongly Disagree         Slightly Disagree            Neutral           Slightly Agree        Strongly Agree 
 
• Canadians will be put at risk if we allow more Syrian refugees into the 
country. 
 1                                     2                               3                            4  5 
Strongly Disagree         Slightly Disagree            Neutral           Slightly Agree        Strongly Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHAPING RESPONSES 140  
Appendix I 
Terrorism Imminence Beliefs 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
1. I’m sure it’s only a matter of time before our country experiences another terrorist 
attack. 
       1                               2                                3                            4   5 
Strongly Disagree      Slightly Disagree       Neutral              Slightly Agree       Strongly Agree 
 
2. The chances of Canada being involved in a terrorist attack are quite large. 
       1                               2                                3                            4   5 
Strongly Disagree      Slightly Disagree       Neutral              Slightly Agree      Strongly Agree 
 
3. I am rarely worried about terrorist attacks in Canada. 
       1                               2                                3                            4   5 
Strongly Disagree      Slightly Disagree       Neutral              Slightly Agree      Strongly Agree 
 
4. I am certain that Canada is safe from terrorist attacks.  
       1                               2                                3                            4   5 
Strongly Disagree      Slightly Disagree       Neutral              Slightly Agree       Strongly Agree 
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Appendix J 
Study 1b Demographics 
Please answer the following questions. All answers will remain confidential. 
• Are you a Canadian citizen? 
 Yes 
 No  
• Do you currently reside in Canada? 
 Yes 
 No  
Age: _______________           
Gender:          
Female 
Male      
Other, Please Specify: _________________ 
 
Ethnic Background (please tick any that apply):   
 White/Caucasian/European  
 Muslim  
 Black/African-American 
 Asian 
 Middle Eastern 
 Aboriginal Peoples of Canada 
 Hispanic/Latino/South American  
 Syrian 
 Refugee 
 Immigrant 
 Other (please specify): __________________________________ 
 
6. Sexual Orientation: 
 Heterosexual      Asexual 
 Homosexual     Don’t know 
 Bisexual    Other. Please specify:___________ 
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• What is the highest level of education you have completed and received credit 
for? (please tick the “highest” obtained) 
 8th Grade or less 
 9th Grade 
 10th Grade 
 11th Grade 
 12st Grade 
 1 year of college/university 
 2 years of college/university 
 3 years of college/university 
   4 years of college/university 
 5 years of college/university 
 6 years of college/university 
 7 years of college/university 
 8 or more years of college/university 
 
• Which political party do you most closely identify with? 
 Green Party 
 New Democratic Party (NDP) 
 Liberal Party of Canada 
 Conservative Party of Canada 
 None 
Other (Please Specify): ___________________ 
 
• What is your yearly income? Please select: 
 zero 
 $1- $9,999 
 $10,000- $29,999 
 $30,000- $49,999 
 $50,000- $69,999 
 $70,000- $89,999 
 $90,000- $109,999 
  $110,000 or above 
 Decline to answer 
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• How did you learn about this survey? 
 Reddit 
 Kijiji 
 Google 
 referred by friend/family 
 other 
 
•  Did you look at or read the comments associated with the posting of this 
survey? (your answer will in no way impact your ability to be entered into 
the giftcard draw) 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not Applicable 
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Appendix K 
Social Dominance Orientation- 7 Scale  
Show how much you favour or oppose each idea below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 
on the scale below. You can work quickly; your first feeling is generally best. 
1    2                 3           4   5      6              7 
Strongly     Somewhat Slightly     Neutral        Slightly Somewhat     Strongly 
Oppose      Oppose Oppose           Favour Favour           Favour 
 
1. Some groups of people must be kept in their place. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
2. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the 
bottom. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
3. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
4. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
5.  Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
6. No one group should dominate in society. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
7. Groups at the bottom should not have to stay in their place. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
8. Group dominance is a poor principle. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
9. We should not push for group equality. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
10. We shouldn’t try to guarantee that every group has the same quality of life. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
11. It is unjust to try to make groups equal. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
12. Group equality should not be our primary goal. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
13. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
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14. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
15. No matter how much effort it takes, we ought to strive to ensure that all groups have 
the same chance in life. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
16. Group equality should be our ideal. 
1    2   3   4   5   6           7 
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Appendix L 
Media Preferences 
How much time to do spend per week watching/reading/listening to the news? 
Less than 1 hour 
1-3 hours 
4- 6 hours 
7-9 hours 
More than 9 hours 
 
Which platforms do you get news from? (check all that apply) 
Television 
News websites 
Social media websites (e.g. Facebook, Twitter) 
Print (e.g. Newspapers, magazines) 
Radio/Podcasts 
Not applicable (I don’t consume news) 
 
Compared to most people, how knowledgeable about world events do you consider 
yourself? 
1  2   3  4  5  6            7 
Much less                Average           Much more 
Knowledgeable                           Knowledgeable 
 
How much time per week do you spend reading (generally)? 
Less than 1 hour 
1-3 hours 
4-6 hours 
7-9 hours 
More than 9 hours 
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Name 4 movies that you enjoy: 
1.{open-ended response} 
2.{open-ended response} 
3.{open-ended response} 
4. {open-ended response} 
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Appendix M 
Links to Manipulation Videos 
Liberal-terrorism: 
Washington Post: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DpufAY_gd-o 
Huffington Post: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u977Dx-8QNI 
CBC: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vbWrWIBaeHM 
 
Conservative-terrorism: 
Sun News: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xISRxMb_vs8 
Fox News: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_2uphYEvTc8 
Global News: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1DjAhOhiw0o 
 
Control: 
NBA: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tS3tjc_gQGs 
NFL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AK6TzCAJVhw 
PGA: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y7fTAEtPNEM 
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Appendix N 
Manipulation Check 
What did the videos show? 
• Sports commentary 
• Terrorism and refugees 
• Anticipated changes in the economy 
• Celebrity gossip 
 
IF CHOOSE A: 
Which sports were shown? 
• Football, golf, soccer 
• Basketball, golf, swimming 
• Football, basketball, golf 
• Swimming, soccer, basketball 
 
IF CHOOSE B: 
Which topics were discussed? 
• Syrian refugees, financial support for ISIS, potential terrorism in Western 
countries (e.g. Canada, Europe) 
• Female ISIS fighters, journalist beheadings, Boston bombings 
• Financial support for ISIS, journalist beheadings, potential terrorism in Western 
countries (e.g. Canada, Europe) 
• Potential terrorism in Western countries (e.g. Canada, Europe), female ISIS 
fighters, Boston bombings 
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Appendix O 
Emotion (Fear and Anger) 
Regarding ISIS, to what extent do you feel: 
   Not at all               Extremely 
Angry   1                 2                 3                4                 5                6                 7 
Scared   1                 2                 3                4                 5                6                 7 
Outraged  1                 2                 3                4                 5                6                 7 
Anxious  1                 2                 3                4                 5                6                 7 
Furious  1                 2                 3                4                 5                6                 7 
Afraid   1                 2                 3                4                 5                6                 7 
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Appendix P 
Military Support 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following items. 
     1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6              7 
 Strongly            Strongly 
Disagree                           Agree 
 
• To put an end to terrorist acts by ISIS, I think it is okay to target civilians and 
fighters alike in foreign terrorist strongholds. 
     1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                7 
• To put an end to terrorist acts by ISIS, I think it is okay to bomb an entire country 
if it is known to harbor ISIS terrorists.  
     1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                7 
• We should spend more time on nonconfrontational efforts, as opposed to 
engaging in military activity, toward ISIS.  
     1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                7 
• I support continued military efforts abroad to seek out potential ISIS terrorists. 
     1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                7 
• We should not be afraid to hunt down any ISIS member who threatens any 
Western country anywhere. 
     1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                7 
• We are being too harsh towards ISIS.  
     1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                7 
• We should strike back with brutal force against members of ISIS who seek to 
intimidate us. 
     1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                7 
• There are ways to deal with ISIS without bringing in heavy artillery.  
      1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                7 
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Appendix Q 
Media Trust 
With regard to the videos you watched, how much do you trust the information presented 
to be valid and reliable? 
1  2  3  4  5  6          7 
Completely                   Completely 
Distrust                      Trust 
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Appendix R 
Study 2 Demographics 
 
Age: _______________           
Gender:          
Female 
Male      
Other, Please Specify: _________________ 
Ethnic Background (please tick any that apply): 
White/Caucasian/European  
Black/African-American 
  Asian 
  Middle Eastern 
Aboriginal Peoples  
Hispanic/Latino/South American  
  Syrian 
  Refugee 
  Arabic 
  Other (please specify): _________________________________ 
 
Are you an immigrant to Canada? 
 Yes 
 No 
Is one, or both, of your parents immigrants to Canada? 
 Yes 
 No 
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Religion (please tick any that apply): 
  Christian 
  Muslim 
Hindu 
  Sikh 
  Buddhist 
  Jewish 
  Atheist/Agnostic (no religion) 
  Other (please specify): ________________________________ 
 
Sexual Orientation: 
  Heterosexual 
  Homosexual  
  Bisexual 
  Asexual 
  Don’t know 
  Other (please specify): ________________________________ 
 
Year in university: ________ 
Major: ___________ 
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Appendix S 
Suspicion Check 
1. Can you guess what the study was about? 
 
         ______________________________________________________________________ 
         ______________________________________________________________________ 
         ______________________________________________________________________ 
         ______________________________________________________________________ 
  ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Did anything about the study make you suspicious (choose one): YES    NO 
 
If yes, please elaborate: 
        _______________________________________________________________________ 
        _______________________________________________________________________ 
        _______________________________________________________________________ 
        _______________________________________________________________________ 
        _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Did any of your friends/ peers/ classmates tell you anything about this study before you 
came to the session? Please note that it is particularly important that you answer this 
question honestly. The study may be compromised otherwise. Note that your responses 
are anonymous, and there will be no negative outcome if you disclose this information 
(i.e., it can still count as course participation etc).  
 
YES                    NO 
 
If YES, please elaborate: 
       _______________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Please add any additional comments you may have about the study here: 
       _______________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
 
 
 
 SHAPING RESPONSES 156  
Appendix T 
 Ethics Clearance Forms 
 
 
Brock University 
Research Ethics Office 
Tel: 905-688-5550 ext. 3035 
Email: reb@brocku.ca 
 
Social Science Research Ethics Board 
 
Certificate of Ethics Clearance for Human Participant Research 
 
 
DATE: 
 
1/8/2016 
 
 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: 
 
HODSON, Gordon - Psychology  
 
FILE: 
 
15-134 - HODSON  
 
TYPE: 
 
Masters Thesis/Project STUDENT: 
 
Megan Earle 
SUPERVISOR: Gordon Hodson 
 
TITLE: Canadian Media Preferences and Social Attitudes 
 
 
ETHICS CLEARANCE GRANTED 
 
 Type of Clearance:  NEW  Expiry Date:  1/31/2017 
  
 
The Brock University Social Science Research Ethics Board has reviewed the above named 
research proposal and considers the procedures, as described by the applicant, to conform to the 
University’s ethical standards and the Tri-Council Policy Statement. Clearance granted from 
1/8/2016 to 1/31/2017. 
 
The Tri-Council Policy Statement requires that ongoing research be monitored by, at a minimum, 
an annual report. Should your project extend beyond the expiry date, you are required to submit a 
Renewal form before 
1/31/2017. Continued clearance is contingent on timely submission of reports. 
 
To comply with the Tri-Council Policy Statement, you must also submit a final report upon 
completion of your project. All report forms can be found on the Research Ethics web page at 
http://www.brocku.ca/research/policies-and-forms/research-forms. 
 
In addition, throughout your research, you must report promptly to the REB: 
a)   Changes increasing the risk to the participant(s) and/or affecting significantly the conduct of 
the study; 
b)   All adverse and/or unanticipated experiences or events that may have real or potential 
unfavourable implications for participants; 
c)   New information that may adversely affect the safety of the participants or the conduct of the 
study; 
d)   Any changes in your source of funding or new funding to a previously unfunded project. 
 
We wish you success with your research. 
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Approved: 
 
Kimberly Maich, Chair 
Social Science Research Ethics Board 
 
Note: Brock University is accountable for the research carried out in its own jurisdiction or under 
its auspices and may refuse certain research even though the REB has found it ethically 
acceptable. 
 
If research participants are in the care of a health facility, at a school, or other institution or 
community organization, it is the responsibility of the Principal Investigator to ensure that 
the ethical guidelines and clearance of those facilities or institutions are obtained and filed 
with the REB prior to the initiation of research at that site. 
 
 
Brock University 
Research Ethics Office 
Tel: 905-688-5550 ext. 3035 
Email: reb@brocku.ca 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHAPING RESPONSES 158  
Social Science Research Ethics Board 
 
Certificate of Ethics Clearance for Human Participant Research 
 
 
DATE: 
 
6/9/2016 
 
 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: 
 
HODSON, Gordon - Psychology  
 
FILE: 
 
15-304 - HODSON  
 
TYPE: 
 
Masters Thesis/Project STUDENT: 
 
Megan Earle 
 
 
 
 TITLE: Political Leaning of News Sources 
 
 
ETHICS CLEARANCE GRANTED 
 
 Type of Clearance:  NEW  Expiry Date:  6/30/2017 
  
 
The Brock University Social Science Research Ethics Board has reviewed the above named 
research proposal and considers the procedures, as described by the applicant, to conform to the 
University’s ethical standards and the Tri-Council Policy Statement. Clearance granted from 
6/9/2016 to 6/30/2017. 
 
The Tri-Council Policy Statement requires that ongoing research be monitored by, at a minimum, 
an annual report. Should your project extend beyond the expiry date, you are required to submit a 
Renewal form before 
6/30/2017. Continued clearance is contingent on timely submission of reports. 
 
To comply with the Tri-Council Policy Statement, you must also submit a final report upon 
completion of your project. All report forms can be found on the Research Ethics web page at 
http://www.brocku.ca/research/policies-and-forms/research-forms. 
 
In addition, throughout your research, you must report promptly to the REB: 
a)   Changes increasing the risk to the participant(s) and/or affecting significantly the conduct of 
the study; 
b)   All adverse and/or unanticipated experiences or events that may have real or potential 
unfavourable implications for participants; 
c)   New information that may adversely affect the safety of the participants or the conduct of the 
study; 
d)   Any changes in your source of funding or new funding to a previously unfunded project. 
 
We wish you success with your research. 
 
 
Approved: 
 
Kimberly Maich, Chair 
Social Science Research Ethics Board 
 
Note: Brock University is accountable for the research carried out in its own jurisdiction or under 
its auspices and may refuse certain research even though the REB has found it ethically 
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acceptable. 
 
If research participants are in the care of a health facility, at a school, or other institution or 
community organization, it is the responsibility of the Principal Investigator to ensure that 
the ethical guidelines and clearance of those facilities or institutions are obtained and filed 
with the REB prior to the initiation of research at that site. 
 
Brock University 
Research Ethics Board 
Tel: 905-688-5550 ext. 3035 
Email: reb@brocku.ca 
 
Social Science Research Ethics Board 
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Certificate of Ethics Clearance for Human Participant Research 
 
 
DATE: 7/5/2016 
 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: HODSON, Gordon - Psychology 
 
FILE: 15-315 - HODSON 
 
TYPE: Masters Thesis/Project STUDENT: Megan Earle 
  SUPERVISOR: Dr. Gordon Hodson 
 
TITLE:  Watching Videos and Media Preferences 
 
 
ETHICS CLEARANCE GRANTED 
 
  Type of Clearance:  NEW  Expiry Date:  7/31/2017 
  
 
The Brock University Social Sciences Research Ethics Board has reviewed the above named 
research proposal and considers the procedures, as described by the applicant, to conform to the 
University’s ethical standards 
and the Tri-Council Policy Statement. Clearance granted from 7/5/2016 to 7/31/2017. 
 
The Tri-Council Policy Statement requires that ongoing research be monitored by, at a 
minimum, an annual report. Should your project extend beyond the expiry date, you are 
required to submit a Renewal form before 
7/31/2017. Continued clearance is contingent on timely submission of reports. 
 
To comply with the Tri-Council Policy Statement, you must also submit a final report upon 
completion of your project. All report forms can be found on the Research Ethics web page at 
http://www.brocku.ca/research/policies-and-forms/research-forms. 
 
In addition, throughout your research, you must report promptly to the REB: 
a)   Changes increasing the risk to the participant(s) and/or affecting significantly the conduct of 
the study; 
b)   All adverse and/or unanticipated experiences or events that may have real or potential 
unfavourable implications for participants; 
c)   New information that may adversely affect the safety of the participants or the conduct of the 
study; 
d)   Any changes in your source of funding or new funding to a previously unfunded project. 
 
We wish you success with your research. 
 
Approved: 
 
 
Sandra Peters, Acting Chair 
Social Sciences Research Ethics Board 
 
Note: Brock University is accountable for the research carried out in its own jurisdiction or 
under its auspices and may refuse certain research even though the REB has found it 
ethically acceptable. 
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If research participants are in the care of a health facility, at a school, or other institution 
or community organization, it is the responsibility of the Principal Investigator to ensure 
that the ethical guidelines and clearance of those facilities or institutions are obtained 
and filed with the REB prior to the initiation of research at that site. 
 
